CONSEIL DES RELATIONS ETRANGERES
R APPORT D'UN F ORCE DE TRAVAIL INDEPENDANT
S PARRAINÉ PAR LE COMITÉ SUR LES R ÉLÉMENTS ÉTRANGERS
G RAHAM T. A LLISON ET P AUL X. K ELLEY , CHEVEUX CO -C
R ICHARD L. G ARWIN , D IRECTEUR DU PROJET
ARMES NON TELLES
ET CAPABILITES
ARMES NON CAPTURES ET CAPACITÉS
Page 2
Armes non mortelles
et capacités
Rapport d'un groupe de travail indépendant
Commandité par le
Conseil des relations étrangères
Graham T. Allison et Paul X. Kelley, coprésidents
Richard L. Garwin, directeur de projet
Page 3
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Page 4
CONTENU
Avant-propos
v
Remerciements
vii
Résumé
1
Rapport du groupe de travail
7
Positionnement des armes non mortelles dans le courant
Capacités américaines
9
Changements en politique, sécurité et technologie
dix
Contexte des armes non mortelles
12
Administration actuelle des armes non mortelles–
Direction commune des armes non létales
14
Un programme élargi d’armes non mortelles
19
Technologies émergentes et besoins non satisfaits
25
Apprendre de l'expérience
28
Mises en garde et commentaires
29
Armes chimiques non létales
30
Résultats
32
Recommandations
35
Opinion additionnelle ou dissidente
38
Membres du groupe de travail
40
Observateurs de la force opérationnelle
45
Des annexes
47
A: actuellement disponible (ou presque disponible)
Armes non mortelles
49
B: Trois fables irakiennes
51
C: Armes chimiques et biologiques non mortelles
58
Page 5
Page 6
[v]
AVANT-PROPOS
La récente guerre en Irak s'est révélée être un triomphe militaire. le
suite à un conflit majeur a cependant été marqué par des pillages.
et sabotage qui a gravement endommagé les infrastructures irakiennes
et érodé le soutien populaire pour les forces de libération. Bien que
force létale est nécessaire pour mener la guerre avec succès, nous apprenons
que ce n'est pas toujours approprié pour gagner la paix. Non mortel
armes - allant de la mousse glissante aux sacs de fèves tirés au pistolet
aux pistolets et filets Taser conçus pour enchevêtrer et arrêter les véhicules -
pourrait être un meilleur moyen d'armer et de protéger les forces américaines et ses alliés
sans tuer des innocents ni détruire des infrastructures civiles.
Indépendant parrainé par le Council on Foreign Relations
Groupe de travail sur les armes et les capacités non mortelles, créé à l'origine
établi en 1995 et réuni de nouveau en juin dernier, a constaté que l’intégration de
ces formes et d'autres formes de capacités non létales plus
dans l’équipement, la formation et la doctrine des forces armées américaines
services pourraient améliorer considérablement la capacité des États-Unis à
atteindre ses objectifs dans tout le spectre de la guerre moderne. Ce rapport,
troisième publication du groupe de travail depuis 1995, soutient que
des difficultés de l’année écoulée aurait pu être minimisée ou
même évités avec un équipement adéquat et une formation à l’utilisation de
armes mortelles.
Le groupe de travail estime que, pour que les États-Unis bénéficient pleinement
des armes et des capacités non létales du Joint Nonléthal
La Direction des armes exige jusqu'à sept fois plus de
le financement; mandat plus large de mener et de financer des programmes en sciences
technologie, ingénierie et développement; et une extension
de la gamme des armes non mortelles à 100 mètres ou plus. La tâche
Force recommande également à l'administration de créer un bureau-
entité économique de taille et de budget suffisants, s’appuyant sur le
Direction des armes non létales, pour servir de point focal unique
pour toutes les activités d'armes non létales.
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Armes et capacités non létales
[vi]
Le rapport, qui comprend un grand nombre d’observations spécifiques
tions et suggestions, constitue une ressource précieuse sur un
sujet important mais sous-estimé. Ma plus profonde gratitude va
aux coprésidents, le Dr Graham T. Allison et le général Paul X.
Kelley, USMC (retraité), ainsi qu’à Richard, directeur du groupe de travail
L. Garwin et les membres du groupe de travail et les observateurs, qui ont
tirés de leurs vastes antécédents dans les forces armées, les
politique de sécurité et de la technologie pour contribuer à la compréhension et au jugement
au contenu et à la forme du rapport. Leurs efforts ont
produit une analyse réfléchie et des recommandations pertinentes.
Richard N. Haass
Président
Conseil des relations étrangères
Février 2004
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[vii]
REMERCIEMENTS
Le rapport du groupe de travail indépendant sur les armes non mortelles
a été une entreprise collective qui reflète les contributions et
travail acharné de nombreuses personnes. Le groupe de travail était composé de
Membres du Conseil et non-membres issus de divers horizons,
anciens officiers militaires, dirigeants d’entreprises,
les micros, les diplomates et le personnel du Congrès. Ils ont tous partagé un actif
intérêt pour la politique américaine en matière d’armes non mortelles ainsi qu’une profonde
préoccupation relative à l'intégration des armes non mortelles dans le
capacités des forces armées.
Les membres du groupe de travail et les observateurs ont participé activement
trois réunions qui se sont tenues au Conseil des relations étrangères
Washington, DC, en juin, juillet et septembre 2003.
ont généreusement partagé leurs idées et offert de précieuses suggestions sur
divers brouillons. Le rapport reflète les points de vue partagés du groupe de travail
membres, sauf indication contraire dans Opinions supplémentaires ou divergentes.
Au cours des trois réunions, le groupe de travail a entendu des
représentants du gouvernement et experts extérieurs. Nous apprécions leur
volonté de partager leurs points de vue sur les défis et
opportunités des armes non mortelles et leur présent et futur
rôle dans les forces armées américaines. Le groupe de travail a grandement bénéficié de
leur expertise.
Je suis particulièrement reconnaissant à Leslie H. Gelb, président du Conseil
ancien président, pour sa vision de la création de ce groupe de travail sur
Armes non mortelles. Je suis également redevable à Richard N. Haass, le
président actuel du Conseil, pour ses suggestions éditoriales, qui ont
renforcement de la focalisation du rapport du groupe de travail. Merci aussi
aux associés de recherche Scott Kemp, James Bergman et Smita Aiyar
pour leur travail inlassable dans la dotation en personnel des réunions du groupe de travail, des organisa-
matériel de diffusion distribué aux participants du groupe de travail, et
vieillissement des nombreux projets qui ont précédé le rapport final.
Richard L. Garwin
Directeur de projet
Page 9
Page 10
[1]
RÉSUMÉ
Au cours des quatre semaines de «conflit majeur» en Irak qui a débuté en mars
19 mars 2003, les forces américaines ont démontré le pouvoir de la formation, de la
formation et opérations conjointes. Cependant, le soutien qui en découle et
La phase de stabilité a été marquée par le pillage, le sabotage et l’assurance.
gency. Intégration plus large des types d'armes non létales existants
(NLW) dans l'armée américaine et Marine Corps aurait pu aider
réduire les dégâts causés par le pillage et le sabotage généralisés
après la fin d'un conflit majeur en Irak. Incorporer ces
et des formes supplémentaires de capacités non létales plus largement dans
l'équipement, la formation et la doctrine des forces armées pourraient
améliorer sensiblement l'efficacité des États-Unis dans la réalisation des objectifs de
guerre moderne. Les armes et les capacités non mortelles ont beaucoup à offrir
également dans la conduite de la guerre, dans la prévention des hostilités et dans
soutien de la défense de la patrie. En effet, une force utilisant non létal
les armes et les capacités ont le potentiel d’atteindre le combat et
soutenir les objectifs plus efficacement qu'une force employant seulement
des moyens mortels. Comment obtenir ces avantages est le sujet de cette
rapport.
Alors que les NLW ne sont pas encore largement intégrés dans l'armée
forces, leur utilité a été démontrée quand ils ont été
utilisé. En mars 1995, une force de US Marines équipée de
NLW a sauvegardé le retrait de 2500 soldats de la paix de l'ONU
de Somalie sans mort parmi les soldats de la paix, le
marines, ou la populace. Par la suite, en 1997, le Comité mixte des
Direction des armes meurtrières (JNLWD) a été créée pour soutenir
le commandant du corps des marines dans son rôle de département
agent exécutif de la Défense pour les armes non mortelles. Fonds-
quelque 30 millions de dollars par an en moyenne au cours des cinq dernières années,
la direction a créé et déployé avec l'armée américaine et
Marine Corps environ 80 ensembles de capacités non létales (NLCS).
Ces ensembles ont été utilisés au Kosovo et en Irak pour aider à fournir
un continuum de force entre «ne tirez pas» et «tirez». Beaucoup de ceux qui
Page 11
Armes et capacités non létales
[2]
ont utilisé ces capacités pour la protection de la force et la
trol sont prompts à chanter leurs louanges. Vu d'une utilisation réussie
dans les conflits à l’étranger, les NLW sont particulièrement indiqués pour la stabilité.
et des opérations de soutien comme celles menées en Irak. Novembre dernier
en Irak, un soldat américain a tiré et a tué le président de l'US-
nommé conseil municipal à Sadr City. Bon équipement et
une formation à l'utilisation de NLW aurait bien pu éviter cette débâcle.
Mais beaucoup de choses doivent changer pour que les États-Unis bénéficient pleinement
des armes et des capacités non létales:
• NLW actuellement déployés sont à courte portée; il y a un besoin urgent
pour étendre la portée à 100 mètres ou plus. Plus de NLW sont nécessaires
Sur le terrain.
• La direction dispose d’un budget pour l’exercice 2004 de 43,4 millions de dollars.
millions, contre 22 millions de dollars par an pour les sept dernières années
années; nous jugeons qu’il est nécessaire de multiplier par sept le résultat,
dans un programme annuel de 300 millions de dollars.
• Le JNLWD est limité au «développement avancé» et ne
ne pas avoir l'autorité nécessaire pour mener ou financer des programmes scientifiques
et technologie, démonstration, ingénierie ou développement.
Cela doit changer car la limitation actuelle limite le taux
de l'avancement des technologies non létales au pas d'un escargot.
Une large gamme de NLW disponibles pour l’utilisation comprend des
armes de traumatologie, telles que plusieurs chargements de billes de caoutchouc pour fusils de chasse
et des grenades, des sacs d'haricot et des marqueurs de teinture, ainsi que des boucliers anti-émeute
et des masques. Parmi les capacités anti-véhicules conçues pour amener
véhicules à l'arrêt sont des bandes de pointe pour dégonfler les pneus, un portable
barrière d'arrêt de véhicule pour une voiture ou un camion léger, et le X-Net
Enchevêtrement de roues pour véhicules plus lourds. Plus récemment déployé est le
dispositif perturbateur électromusculaire - le Taser - conçu pour
invalider de manière temporaire un adversaire. Sont également inclus dans le NLCS:
grenades flash-bang, lumières intenses pour éclairer les champs de bataille
(et pour éblouir l’adversaire), des dispositifs laser éblouissants qui
protéger temporairement une personne ou un groupe des tirs de tireurs d’élite, et treize 10
Watt Bullhorns. Il est important de noter que ce ne sont pas des armes
mais des capacités non létales. Moyens additionnels et plus efficaces
Page 12
Résumé
[3]
peut être développé pour l'observation à distance de groupes mixtes et
pour inhiber l'action d'individus sélectionnés. NLW existants ont
été évalué et approuvé par le programme de la direction qui
évalue à la fois les effets humains des NLW et leur environnement.
acceptabilité tal; futures NLW seront évaluées de manière similaire.
mode.
La surveillance des exigences communes du département de la défense
Conseil (JROC), présidé par le vice-président du Joint Chiefs
du personnel, a approuvé une déclaration de besoin de mission pour une famille de
capacités non létales en décembre 2002. Selon le communiqué,
L’armée américaine n’a pas la capacité d’attaquer des cibles localisées ou
telle que l’application d’incendies meurtriers et destructeurs soit prohibitive
ou irait à l'encontre des objectifs et buts des États-Unis. Opéra-
Il n’existe pas d’applications internationales et stratégiques des armes non mortelles. Au
niveau opérationnel, les forces militaires américaines n’ont pas la capacité d’attaquer des cibles localement.
où l’application d’incendies mortels irait à l’encontre de la surexploitation.
tous les objectifs de la campagne. Au niveau stratégique, les États-Unis ont besoin d'une stratégie non létale
capacité qui peut aider à désamorcer les situations volatiles, à vaincre la désinformation
campagnes et briser le cycle de la violence qui prolonge ou échappe souvent
Conflit tardif.
Le groupe de travail souscrit à cette évaluation et demande instamment à la
Il est essentiel de comprendre que l’application mesurée et variable de la force est essentielle.
atteindre les objectifs limités de l'Amérique, tout en évitant de se blesser
non-combattants et dommages à l'infrastructure civile.
L’énoncé des besoins de la mission appelle à des capacités au niveau stratégique.
niveau gic pour contrer les campagnes de désinformation et briser
le cycle de la violence. Conseil des relations étrangères précédent
rapports ont souligné non seulement l’importance d’inhiber la haine
des émissions complètes, comme celles de la radio RTLM, qui ont incité
la population hutue au Rwanda pour tuer les Tutsis, mais aussi la nécessité de
être en mesure de transmettre des émissions américaines ou des Nations Unies à la radio ou
Chaînes de télé. De plus, il existe un besoin évident de moyens à court
invasion et destruction visant à décourager la tolérance ou le soutien des États
pour activités terroristes. Ces moyens pourraient inclure le refus de
décideurs de l'électricité fiable ou des communications.
Le JNLWD n’a actuellement aucun programme de ce type et le groupe de travail
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Armes et capacités non létales
[4]
était incapable d'obtenir l'accès à tout ce qui pourrait exister dans l'armée
prestations de service. Dans le passé, les troupes américaines ont beaucoup souffert du manque
de ces capacités ou de l'incapacité ou de la réticence à utiliser de telles
comme ont existé.
Le groupe de travail conclut que le déploiement plus large des systèmes existants
Capacité NLW - équipement, formation et connaissance du commandement -
l’amélioration de l’efficacité des États-Unis dans l’établissement d’un
société civile après un conflit majeur. NLW avancée et augmentée
capacité de livraison améliorée pour les NLW existants pourrait réduire l’infra-
dommages à la structure lors d'opérations de combat. Un programme américain pour équiper
les forces gouvernementales en Afghanistan et en Irak avec les types existants de
NLW renforcerait l'autorité et permettrait le recours à la force non mortelle
acceptables pour le public de ces États et de l'étranger.
Comme nous l'avons indiqué, des changements majeurs sont nécessaires dans NLW
substance, budget et organisation. En ce qui concerne le fond, nous préconisons
cate une approche à quatre volets:
1. Développer le déploiement (et la formation à leur utilisation) de la
louer plus largement des NLW à courte portée dans le Corps des Marines et
dans l’infanterie de l’armée au-delà du déploiement principal actuel de NLW.
dans la police militaire. Veiller à ce que l'US Navy and Air
Les forces ont de telles capacités adaptées pour leur protection de force
missions et fournir un soutien et d'encouragement pour d'autres uniques
capacités non létales spécifiques à la mission.
2. Élargissez la portée des charges utiles NLW actuelles à 100 mètres, ainsi
au-delà de la plage de projection de pierres, grâce à une livraison de précision et
systèmes d'ingénierie.
3. Achever la qualification pour le développement, les essais et les effets humains.
cations du système de déni de surface en ondes millimétriques pouvant
imposer un comportement aversif à des centaines de mètres de distance
en chauffant la peau, apparemment sans lésion permanente, et
sur le terrain des premiers modèles du système.
4. Par un financement et un soutien technique plus agressifs, faire progresser la
développement d'autres concepts tels que le laser tactique avancé—
qui promet d’être utilisé contre des équipements - avec
l’avènement des charges utiles non létales qui s’installent sur un point laser.
Page 14
Résumé
[5]
Département de la défense actuel (DOD) et services de
grammes sont tout simplement inadéquats en taille et en portée pour donner ces avantages.
efits de NLW. Construire sur les armes communes non létales
Direction, l’administration devrait créer une entité suffisante pour
taille et budget suffisants qui constituent le point focal unique pour tous les NLW
activité.
En outre, le groupe de travail recommande ce qui suit:
1. Le secrétaire à la Défense procède à un examen approfondi de NLW
dans le but de fournir des orientations spécifiques aux services
résultera en une capacité NLW plus robuste et plus étendue
ity. Ce guide devrait garantir que toutes les facettes d’une non-discrimination complète
programme d'armes mortelles sont fournis des ressources dans le but
d'accélérer les capacités de base et avancées de NLW à tous
des services.
2. Élargir la portée et l'efficacité de la NLW américaine
programme:
une. Un JNLWD fortement développé ou un nouveau projet de joint commun
gramme (NLJPO) dirigé par un officier général chargé de
accès à tous les éléments de programme (catégories budgétaires 6.0
à 6.6) élèverait le statut de priorité actuel de NLW sans
dans le DOD. Il devrait fonctionner à environ 200 millions de dollars.
lion à 400 millions de dollars par an avec la mission de remplir
l’énoncé des besoins de la mission JROC pour une famille commune de
armes mortelles.
b. Au sein du Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), il devrait y avoir
être une petite cellule de soutien pour NLW qui travaillerait en étroite collaboration avec
le JNLWD élargi, à la fois pour informer la direction des besoins
et pour faciliter le placement du prototype et de la production
capacités au sein de JFCOM. Les tâches énoncées par JFCOM comprennent
«Découvrir des alternatives prometteuses grâce à un concept commun
développement et expérimentation, définissant les améliorations à
conditions de guerre communes, en développant des
capacités par le biais d’une formation et de solutions communes, et
des forces et des capacités communes aux commandants de guerre. "
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Armes et capacités non létales
[6]
3. Des actions sont nécessaires pour éliminer les obstacles à la constitution
des armes non mortelles. Il est nécessaire d'intégrer l'information
et la formation concernant les capacités NLW dans le programme de
écoles à tous les niveaux dans chaque service; cela augmenterait à son tour
le taux d'intégration de la NLW dans les capacités de la force actuelle. le
Le DOD peut contribuer à ce processus en mettant l'accent sur l'acquisition
capacité existante et éprouvée en NLW, ainsi que par le dévelop-
l’évaluation précoce et les choix faits parmi les programmes à haut rendement
systèmes.
Malgré notre évaluation selon laquelle la nation manque de possibilités et de
capacités non létales essentielles, la Task Force est encouragée par
la performance exceptionnelle à ce jour du Joint Nonlethal
Direction des armes. Une autre indication encourageante était que
début novembre 2003, dans le cadre du prochain Guide de planification stratégique.
Secrétaire général de la Défense aura besoin de combattre
Les commandants de fourmis "pour identifier ce dont ils ont besoin pour des armes non mortelles
et de planifier l'utilisation d'armes non mortelles dans les opérations. "
Cela devrait initier une planification descendante urgente dans le cadre de la Défense.
Département et les différents services armés. Une telle planification devrait
être augmentée par la création d'une demande pour ces armes de
le terrain, à mesure que le personnel acquiert de l'expérience avec l'équipement prototype
fournie par la direction commune ou son successeur. Cette approche mixte
(développement en spirale) est susceptible de déboucher bientôt sur de meilleures capacités-
que celui qui est limité à la production d’équipements et à la
déploiement à l'échelle de la force.
Page 16
[7]
RAPPORT DE LA TASK FORCE
Le groupe de travail indépendant sur les armes non mortelles (NLW)
et capacités mis en place début 2003 par le Conseil de for-
Les Relations étrangères se sont rencontrées en juin, juillet et septembre. Un avis semblait
compte tenu des mesures prises par le Comité mixte le 10 décembre 2002
Conseil de surveillance des exigences (JROC).
Le JROC (présidé par le vice-président du Joint Chiefs of
Général Peter Pace) a avalisé et transmis à la sous-commission
secrétaire de la défense pour les acquisitions, la technologie et la logistique un joint
Mission Need Statement (MNS) pour une famille de personnes non létales
bilités. 1 Dans «Timing and Priority», le MNS note:
"Les services et les commandants de combattants considèrent une famille de
capacités mortelles d'être un besoin hautement prioritaire qui doit être satisfait
immédiatement."
«Lacunes actuelles (lacunes). L'armée américaine n'a pas la capacité
d'engager des cibles situées ou positionnées de telle sorte que l'application
des incendies meurtriers et destructeurs sont prohibitifs ou seraient contre-productifs
aux objectifs américains. Applications opérationnelles et stratégiques de
les armes non létales n'existent pas. Au niveau opérationnel, les forces militaires américaines
manque la capacité d'engager des cibles situées là où l'application d'incendies mortels
serait contre-productif par rapport aux objectifs généraux de la campagne. À la stratégie
niveau gic, les États-Unis ont besoin d’une capacité non létale qui puisse aider à désamorcer
situations volatiles, surmonter les campagnes de désinformation et briser le cycle
de violence qui prolonge ou aggrave souvent le conflit ".
Le besoin est caractérisé par le fait que «le contrôle des populations hostiles, la minimisation
dommages à l'infrastructure, à la maîtrise de la létalité des conflits et au contrôle à long
terme «impacts environnementaux». La demande ne concerne pas seulement l’amélioration de
capacités de protection, mais pour une portée améliorée et une distance tactique suffisante
pour contrer le personnel, l'observation, la communication, etc., c'est-à-dire pour
«Options non létales dans chaque capacité principale pouvant être appliquées à
gamme d'opérations militaires. "
1 Les paragraphes en retrait suivants résument le MNS, ainsi que quelques
expressions identifiées comme des citations directes.
Page 17
Armes et capacités non létales
[8]
Le MNS identifie plusieurs options potentielles. Fumée et
obscurcissants, ainsi que le marquage, le suivi et la localisation.
appareils de ingénierie. Des technologies habilitantes telles que «fragiles ou com-
boîtiers compressibles, micro-encapsulation et fusion de proximité »
identifiés pour élargir la gamme et améliorer les effets de la
louer des munitions. Une plus grande capacité de modélisation et de simulation est
demandées pour de meilleures estimations de l’impact sur l’environnement, de la confiance,
etc.
La mission de NLW devrait être de «fournir plus de flexibilité
options, adapter les effets pour obtenir la réponse souhaitée, proposer une réversibilité
des effets et réduire ou éviter les pertes et / ou les pertes non-combattants
destruction involontaire d'équipement ou d'infrastructure. "
Certains de ces objectifs du JROC peuvent être atteints en augmentant
l’achat et l’intégration des capacités actuelles, d’autres nécessitent des
développement international de technologies connues ou d'inventions extensives,
recherche et choix.
Le but initial du groupe de travail actuel était donc d’évaluer
déterminer dans quelle mesure NLW et la formation et les
les tics étaient intégrés aux plans et aux opérations; et le
dans quelle mesure ils devraient être disponibles et ainsi intégrés. Atteindre
la capacité prévue par le JROC, les services et les
les commandants de combattants auraient besoin d'évaluer le statut de
NLW et le potentiel de future NLW de manière plus urgente et sur une
à plus grande échelle. Développement et intégration dans les services, avec
une formation appropriée et des modifications de la doctrine seraient nécessaires.
Notez cependant que des progrès peuvent également être réalisés grâce à un appel à la demande.
mécanisme: prototype NLW peut être placé avec nos forces opérationnelles
pour obtenir des commentaires essentiels des utilisateurs et (en cas de succès) créer une demande
remonter la chaîne de commandement.
La question demeure: où se situe le ministère de la Défense
(DOD) et les forces armées sont sur la route pour acquérir et
intégrer ces capacités?
Nous avons trouvé peu de preuves que la valeur et la transformation
applications des armes non mortelles dans tout le spectre des conflits
sont appréciés par la haute direction du ministère de la Défense.
Malgré des succès à petite échelle, NLW n’est pas encore entrée sur le marché.
général de la pensée et des achats de la défense. En conséquence,
Page 18
Rapport du groupe de travail
[9]
ce rapport s'adresse au bureau du secrétaire à la défense
(OSD) - principalement le secrétaire et le secrétaire adjoint à la Défense
avec les chefs d’état-major (JCS). Soutien et initiative
sont également nécessaires auprès du Conseil national de sécurité (CNS) et
des forces armées et des comités d'appropriation de la
Sénat et la Chambre.
P OSITIONNEMENT DE LA NÉGOCIATION DE PAYS EN
CAPACITÉS ACTUELLES DES ÉTATS- UNIS
Dans la guerre du Golfe de 1991, les forces américaines ont utilisé pour la première fois un grand
mettre à l'échelle les forces et les tactiques créées pendant la guerre froide. Celles-ci
ont été affinés et étendus lors d'actions ultérieures au Kosovo, en Afghanistan
après le 11 septembre 2001 et plus récemment en Irak en 2003.
la pression des défenses anti-aériennes (ou leur absence) a permis la livraison flexible
de bombes de haute précision à faible coût pour détruire des cibles
être observés visuellement ou ceux dont la localisation pourrait être pré-
précisément cartographié. La capacité de vision nocturne, la mobilité, la puissance de feu et la
L’armure a permis aux forces terrestres américaines de se déplacer et de survoler rapidement.
whelm forces ennemies.
La haute qualité et la formation du personnel militaire américain ont été
essentiel à la performance de ces exploits. La capacité évolutive
des guerres centrées sur le réseau permettaient le renseignement, la recon-
naissance, et la surveillance doit être accomplie et transmise à
vitesse sans précédent, en particulier par satellite et par avion sans pilote
l’imagerie cellulaire (UAV), mais aussi par le renseignement des transmissions et les forces spéciales
par terre.
Les précédentes équipes spéciales du Conseil en 1999 et 1995 ont été examinées
aspects des technologies et des capacités de la NLW. 2 Les rapports fournis
a encouragé et a généralisé l’utilisation des systèmes existants pour le
tection, le contrôle des foules et le combat urbain, ainsi que le développement
NLW plus efficace à la fois pour ces tactiques et pour les projets à plus grande échelle.
2 Technologies non létales: progrès et perspectives: rapport d’une tâche indépendante
Force parrainée par le Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations Press, 1999). Ce rapport comprend également le rapport de 1995. Le rapport est disponible
sur www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=3326 .
Page 19
Armes et capacités non létales
[dix]
les usages. Les rapports ont également souligné le spectre continu de
NLW à des outils tels que les opérations psychologiques (psyops) et
autres aspects de la guerre de l'information, ainsi que l'utilité de la
capacités des armes pour la détection et la perturbation.
CHANGEMENTS DANS LES POLITIQUES , LA SÉCURITÉ ET LA TECHNOLOGIE
La politique et la technologie ont changé à un rythme vertigineux. La paix-
La dissolution complète de l'Union soviétique est une vieille nouvelle, mais la sécurité
les problèmes abondent dans le nouveau monde. Depuis 1991, les États-Unis
a combattu les forces de Saddam Hussein à deux reprises en Irak, a destitué le Tal-
iban en Afghanistan et blessé al-Qaïda sur son domicile afghan
territoire. L’autonomisation de l’individu à des fins de destruction a
des questions sur la conduite de la guerre, la reddition, le contrôle et
la gouvernance. Pendant la paix et la guerre, mais particulièrement dans un théâtre
guerre au lendemain des combats, il faut maintenant attendre et
pour faire face aux djihadistes, intrépides et tactiques de guérilla, y compris
attentat suicide.
Une évolution ultérieure se situe dans les aspects de la guerre asymétrique.
tarif Celles-ci vont des efforts pour contrer, plutôt que pour imiter,
Capacités américaines telles que le système de positionnement global (GPS)
signifie illégal en vertu des règles de la guerre, telles que la mise en place par l'Iraq de
éléments de défense ou de mortier dans les écoles ou les hôpitaux. Comme on le voit en Irak,
les combattants ennemis armés d’armes légères peuvent fusionner avec la population.
tion, protégés par leur connaissance du fait que les forces américaines
par la présence de civils innocents de répondre avec
force meurtrière à un tireur d'élite ou le tir d'une grenade propulsée par fusée
(RPG).
Dans le même temps, l’évolution de la technologie, en particulier de l’informa-
technologie de l’information - a eu un impact révolutionnaire sur la
société. Une révolution ou une transformation est en cours aux États-Unis
militaire aussi. Il ne s’applique pas seulement aux armes pour détruire les mili-
du matériel et du personnel, ainsi que de la cyberguerre et des
armes, mais aussi à d’énormes changements dans le rythme des combats.
Pour les attaques aériennes sur des cibles au sol, le temps de cycle du renseignement,
Page 20
Rapport du groupe de travail
[11]
nomination cible, et l'attaque est maintenant heures ou même quelques minutes
plutôt que des jours. Toute modification ou restructuration proposée doit être
évalués dans le contexte de ces capacités en évolution et non dans
celle des anciennes forces de base.
Les États-Unis ont amplement démontré leur capacité à frapper
cibles définies avec des bombes guidées et des missiles de longues distances
avec une précision de quelques mètres, et avec tir direct des chars
et de l'artillerie. Depuis un avion en orbite, le temps de réponse peut être un
minute - principalement le temps de chute de la bombe auto-guidée. Avec
observation directe à partir d'hélicoptères ou même d'UAV, la réponse
le temps peut être des secondes.
Certains matériels et organisations américains existants ne correspondent pas à ce niveau élevé.
nouveau visage de la guerre et les détails de la transformation de la force
sont correctement en litige. Alors que la transformation est en cours, le
robustesse de ces nouvelles capacités, leur adéquation et l'optimisation
mélange de transformation et d'évolution est encore en cours d'évaluation.
ated. Qu'il reste encore des problèmes à surmonter était évident dans
l’efficacité des leurres au Kosovo imitant les véhicules blindés
cles et dans les attaques continues contre le personnel américain sur le
sol en Irak, causant des blessures, voire la mort, ainsi que des interférences avec
la conduite de la mission.
L’adversaire s’adapte et son adaptation peut être rapide car elle
est une question de survie. Une adaptation a été l'utilisation croissante
des installations souterraines qui ne sont pas affectées par des munitions normales.
Nous devons nous adapter à cette adaptation, en utilisant l’intelligence pour identifier
fy entrées et sorties qui peuvent ensuite être attaquées avec précision
armes.
Dans la transformation d'un processus ou d'un produit, il y a souvent
éléments moins sujets à évolution. Dans le cas de l'armée américaine,
bien que la lutte contre les principales forces identifiables avec l'évolution américaine
capacités communes a été une réalisation majeure, la tâche et
conflits se sont déplacés vers une résistance plus dispersée - souvent
fondée ou même masquée par la présence importante de civils - beaucoup
d'entre eux innocent d'intention hostile. Dans cet enjeu de plus en plus important
aspect de la guerre, les armes non mortelles sont un outil important.
Page 21
Armes et capacités non létales
[12]
B ACKGROUND ON N ONLETHAL W EAPONS
Nonlethal weapons are defined by the Department of Defense as
“discriminate weapons that are explicitly designed and employed
to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities
and undesired damage to property and environment.” Both the term
NLW and the definition leave something to be desired. Dans un
sense, “nonlethal weapons” is a misnomer. The program includes,
importantly, technologies and tactics that are not “weapons.” And
there is no requirement that NLW be incapable of killing or of
causing permanent damage. Moreover, the ideal NLW would be
a system with continuously variable intensity and influence, rang-
ing from a warning tap to a stunning blow to a lethal effect. Comme
with lethal weapons, much of the impact of NLW is psycholog-
ical—persuading people that they would much rather be some-
place else, or on our side rather than opposing US military
les forces. Yet alternative terms such as “less lethal weapons” do not
seem to capture the meaning sufficiently better to repay the effort
required to change the name.
Some of the anti-materiel goals of nonlethal weapons may be
achieved by lethal weapons capable of precision attack. Leur
effect on materiel is destructive but in some cases with very lim-
ited unintended damage. Such is the case, for instance, with the
use of a laser-guided bomb (or one guided by GPS) to destroy under-
ground fiber optic cable. Or on occasion concrete-filled bombs can
demolish a small structure with minor damage to neighboring facil-
ities. Bearing witness to such precision attack by nominally lethal
weapons were Baghdad residents confidently and casually report-
ing by cell phone from their terraces the attack on a government
building across the city. A downside of the speed of conquest—
achieved in this case by reliance on discriminating, effective
weapons—was the escape and merging into civil society of the vast
majority of the enemy combatants without prior capture, processing,
and release.
Nonlethal weapons first achieved prominence in US military
operations when they were used to facilitate and safeguard the extrac-
tion of UN forces from Somalia in 1995. The conventional alter-
Page 22
Task Force Report
[13]
native was the use of firepower to suppress and scatter crowds and
militants. Instead, commanders managed on an urgent basis to bring
into the military theater techniques used in domestic law enforce-
ment and crowd or riot control. In a law enforcement confronta-
tion, the police typically outnumber their adversaries, but there are
often many innocent bystanders. In some situations, however, a
relatively few officials must control a crowd or deal with a riot, and
for this there are familiar tools—tear gas, water cannon, blunt-trau-
ma projectiles such as rubber bullets, marking dyes, barricades, and
flash-bang grenades. NLW help to provide a continuum of force
between “shoot” and “don't shoot.” As such, they may prevent crowds
and even armed combatants from massing a large antagonistic force
in close proximity to US forces. One example is recounted in Appen-
dix B, together with three potential encounters.
Distinct from blunt-trauma devices such as rubber bullets,
bean bags, and sponge projectiles is the Taser—a pistol that fires
two barbs trailing wires, along which controlled, very high volt-
age is automatically transmitted, to definitively and temporarily
immobilize the person targeted. There are also anti-materiel
capabilities, such as the ancient caltrops that, deployed on a road
or path, effectively puncture tires and immobilize many vehicles.
Other types of anti-materiel items include net-type vehicle stop-
pers. Appendix A lists existing and developmental NLW.
Since 1997, the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate ( JNLWD)
has had the responsibility for developing, testing, standardizing,
and preparing for procurement these types of tactical capabilities.
Most recently, they have been incorporated in nonlethal capabil-
ity sets (NLCS), of which some 18 exist in the US Army and some
50 in the Marine Corps. Six NLCS were deployed with army units
in the Iraq theater.
Page 23
Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
[14]
C URRENT A DMINISTRATION OF N ONLETHAL W EAPONS –
J OINT N ONLETHAL W EAPONS D IRECTORATE
Established in 1997, the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate serves
as the focal point for NLW research and development efforts on
behalf of the DOD. The National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year (FY) 1996 designated that the commandant of the
Marine Corps, as the executive agent for the NLW program
based in Quantico, Virginia, would be “responsible for program
recommendations and for stimulating and coordinating NLW require-
ments.” The undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technolo-
gy, and logistics exercises the principal oversight for NLW policy,
while the undersecretary of defense for policy helps produce a usage
policy for NLWs. An Integrated Product Team (IPT)—composed
of flag officers from each service, who have equal votes—provides
guidance and approves the budget. Nonvoting members of the IPT
include Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice
(DOJ), and Department of Energy (DOE) representatives; com-
batant commanders; and Joint Staff representatives. Additional-
ly, a Council of Colonels is used to collect information from all
the services to guide research efforts.
The JNLWD is a joint organization; its scope is based on
direction from DOD D 3000.3 Policy. It seeks undeveloped tech-
nologies from the science and technology (S&T) community
and then presents them to the services as possible concepts. Si un
service wants to purchase the concept, the JNLWD will fund all
research and development costs up to milestone C (full-rate pro-
duction) to the extent that its budget allows. The service must then
pay for the procurement.
The establishment of the directorate provided a substantial increase
in the services' capability for force protection, dependent on the
products and results of JNLWD activities that were evaluated and,
where appropriate, brought into the services—specifically, into the
forces under the combatant commanders (COCOMs). The joint-
ly staffed JNLWD supports the Department of Defense's exec-
utive agent for NLW, the commandant of the Marine Corps.
Page 24 Task Force Report
[15]
The army has established an NLW Integrated Concept Team
to routinely pull together relevant players from the service to dis-
cuss and define NLW requirements. Thus far, army NLW has been
primarily in the domain of the military police (MP) rather than
the infantry. Clearly, with current army commitments, infantry units
would benefit from expanded NLW capabilities. The Marine
Corps Combat Development Command has adopted a system of
education and “requirements pull” through the mechanism of a Marine
Corps NLW Integrated Product Team with membership from the
operating forces to stimulate its requirements identification
processus.
The directorate's efforts to work closely with all services to meet
their mission-driven needs for nonlethal weapons technologies are
constrained by its small staff of 19 government personnel and bud-
get of $24.3 million for FY 2003. The JNLWD staff spends a lot
of effort on necessary administration, ranging from the prepara-
tion of budgets to congressional testimony to responding to
requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). À
what extent the burden could be eased within the staff limitation
by the more extensive use of contract personnel is not clear. Dans tous
case, a much larger program than the FY 2004 $43.4 million and
19 staff members would be required to provide the development,
evaluation, and human effects testing for a wider range of tacti-
cal, operational, and strategic NLW capabilities. Past and projected
budget figures are shown in the following table on the next page.
While the JNLWD has done an excellent job in developing and
fielding current NLW capabilities, it has been too severely under-
staffed and underfunded to address much development beyond ele-
ments of force protection. It has not had the staff to coordinate
fully with other governments in order to obtain promptly the best
ideas and technologies nor even to coordinate fully with other agen-
cies within the United States. Currently the JNLWD has only 2
staff members who participate in about 20 war games out of 300
formally identified exercises in the DOD. The directorate can there-
fore play no more than a minor role in the larger (1,000-person)
war games. Thus it is missing many opportunities and requirements
to be represented in war games, to provide information at various
Page 25
JNLW ré Budget and Projections
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Core ($millions) 9,3 $ 16,1 $
21,9 $ $22.8 $22.1 $21.3 22,9 $
$43.4*** $43.5
$44.1 $44.6 45,2 $
45,7 $ Plus-up $12.0* $3.0* $6.0* $11.8** $1.4* T Total ($ millions) 9,3 $ 16,1 $
$33.9 $25.8 28,1 $ $33.1 $24.3 $43.4 $43.5 $44.1 $44.6 45,2 $ 45,7 $
* Congressional plus-up. ** PBD 810:increased funding by $10.4 million per year in addition to congressional plus-up. *** PBD 751C:increased FYDP funding by $18 million per year.
La source:
June 18,2003,P
presentation of the Joint Non l ethal Weapons Directorate at the first meeting of the Non l ethal Weapons Task Force by Colonel
David PK archer,USMC.
Page 26 Task Force Report
[17]
levels in the military and elsewhere, and to take the initiative to
explain to potential users the capabilities and limitations of NLW.
Likewise, the JNLWD has insufficient resources to ensure
that information on the status of NLW is present at all necessary
niveaux. Virtually all the DOD's NLW research and development
(R&D) is being funded by the JNLWD program budget. The increase
in the budget to $43.4 million for FY 2004 and to $45.7 million
for FY 2009 is inadequate if NLW are to play their proper role
in the transformation of US military capabilities. The budget is
inadequate even for development, and JNLWD's authority does
not extend to procurement. In addition, the JNLWD provides com-
plex and expensive human effects testing services for both the mil-
itary and the greater NLW user community, including law
enforcement groups. To the extent that NLW will be used on mixed
combatant and civilian groups, it is important to understand their
effects on children as well as adults. NLW effects must be under-
stood in order to allow the setting of rules of engagement that will
protect both the security and the reputation of America's armed
les forces.
A staff of 19 is insufficient for the JNLWD to process the infor-
mation to which it potentially has access, both from the services
and from international NLW programs. An increased budget
could not only stimulate R&D conceptual efforts and help mature
potential NLW solutions but could also assist in financing the acqui-
sition of a greater number of NLW and in providing improved edu-
cation and support exercises across the DOD.
Since the JNLWD has access only to program element (PE)
line 6.3B, or advanced development, to fund NLW, a program out-
side of that category (in S&T funding or demonstration, engineering,
and development) has to be funded by the services. Without sig-
nificant and dedicated funding for NLW S&T, technology in this
field will advance at a snail's pace.
The services have identified $70 million in desired concept devel-
opment beyond the $24.3 million budget of the JNLWD. As a con-
sequence, it is likely that innovations come late, and procurement
funds will be expended on inferior technologies for lack of aware-
ness of better ones. Despite the existence of various coordinating
Page 27
Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
[18]
groups and integrated product teams, the JNLWD remains
formally as a line item in the Marine Corps budget that must com-
pete with other Marine Corps programs. Therefore it has been sim-
ply too small and is positioned at too low a level to work across
the entire span of potential NLW—including directed energy.
Despite limited funds and lack of manpower, the directorate
has several visible accomplishments, including the development
of the nonlethal capabilities set (NLCS). First fielded in 1997, these
sets contain about 55 types of NLW in four different modules to
equip military units with a range of nonlethal support, includ-
ing pepper spray, portable bullhorns, plastic handcuffs, high-
intensity light systems, and personal protection equipment such
as face and body shields and shin guards.
Among the newer NLW capabilities being developed or field-
ed are the mobility denial system, which would stop vehicles
by spreading a slick substance across a road; the portable vehicle-
arresting barrier (PVAB), which would be able to stop a 7,500-pound
vehicle traveling up to 45 miles per hour within 200 feet; et le
running gear entanglement system (RGES), a rapidly deployable
rope that can stop a boat, for example, by entangling its propellers.
The directorate is also conducting major initiatives in NLW
technology that include high-power microwaves (HPM) for
countering equipment containing electronics (including some
vehicles), counterpersonnel lasers, and countermateriel lasers.
One of its largest efforts is the active denial system (ADS) that
uses millimeter wave energy to create an intolerable skin heating
sensation, repelling targets without damage. With its long range
and rapid, universal, and reversible effect, ADS has many poten-
tial military applications. More coordination will be required for
the use of such a weapon that has its own vehicle and operators.
The services of such a system must be requested or assigned to a
particular mission.
Page 28
Task Force Report
[19]
A N E XPANDED N ONLETHAL W EAPONS P ROGRAM
An expanded NLW program should invest significant sums of money
on the NLW component of future twenty-first-century warfight-
ing needs, including
• Directed energy;
• A robust S&T program;
• Human effects characterization;
• Operational development and improvement of existing NLW;
et
• Establishing dedicated test facilities or cells to support S&T
as well as R&D.
Sure and rapid progress requires that the staff be augmented
by skilled engineers and scientists with expert knowledge in areas
comprenant
• Directed energy;
• Electromagnetic coupling;
• Modeling; et
• Physiology.
Of course most of the funds will be spent on contracts to
industry, including research institutes and universities.
For purposes of both continuity and leadership there should be
an executive director position (at the senior executive service
[SES] level) as a civilian counterpart to the flag officer director.
To aid with wider integration of nonlethal capabilities into
US forces and operations, the JNLWD will need to expand its
capability for outreach to
• Appropriate JCS staff;
• Formal service schools;
Page 29
Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
[20]
• Treaty organizations (ie, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
[NATO] schools); et
• Peacekeeping centers around the world.
An expanded NLW program should also work to develop
robust modeling and simulation and decision-support tools for joint
and service-unique nonlethal capabilities. These tools should be
available to
• Law enforcement personnel;
• War game and simulation efforts;
• Coalition authorities; et
• Nascent governments in areas of recent conflict.
Current and future investments should include a broadening
and strengthening of the joint service capabilities and supporting
service-unique needs through
• Operational-level NLW capabilities that steer and support
transformational concepts;
• Marriage of psychological operations (psyops) with informa-
tion warfare; et
• Highly classified initiatives.
JNLWD should create a formal interagency support function,
with interfaces in the
• Department of Homeland Security;
• Department of Homeland Defense;
• Department of Energy;
• Department of State; et
• Department of Justice.
This function might include small cells of people in these depart-
ments to enable the directorate to communicate efficiently with
Page 30
Task Force Report
[21]
and to learn from people who spend most of their time in these
interagency contacts in the development of operational concepts
and the definition of requirements.
A Caution
Because of classification barriers, the present Task Force was
largely limited to considering point- and crowd-control mea-
sures and could not examine cyber, electronic, or communications
warfare or anti-materiel technologies. We note that the legislation
establishing the Joint Nonlethal Directorate mandated oversight
over these areas. We recognize that a small directorate could not
in fact exercise such a vast responsibility. The directorate also
recognized this and agreed to substitute “insight” for “oversight.”
Even that insight, however, has in fact been sharply limited. le
leadership of the NLW program must have more frequent and deep-
er insights into classified programs in the services that contribute
to or bear on nonlethal capabilities.
To achieve the much larger NLW program and its early inte-
gration into the US Armed Forces, the Task Force considered two
options for the substantial expansion and acceleration of the
NLW program, which we regard as essential for the transforma-
tion of the military. The outline in the box on pages 22–23 guid-
ed the Task Force's consideration of a Joint Program Office ( JPO)
or greatly expanded JNLWD.
Page 31
[22]
ISSUE: CREATION OF A JOINT PROGRAM
OFFICE TO MANAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NONLETHAL WEAPONS
Current Situation
• The commandant of the Marine Corps has served as the exec-
utive agent for nonlethal weapons since 1997.
• The Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate was established to
execute and manage NLW program development and to
conduct centralized coordination and integration of NLW tech-
nologies and systems in accordance with a Joint Service
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).
• Each service exercises development of NLW technologies through
separate service-specific milestone decision authorities.
• While NLW are recognized as a requirement for combatant
commanders, each service independently determines its NLW
requirements (at varying levels) and prioritizes NLW against
other competing requirements in the planning, program-
ming, and budgeting process. The current procurement effort
by all the services is less than $5 million per year.
Unique Nature of NLW
• The DOD seeks transformational capabilities of which
NLW are clearly a part.
• NLW are unique because of the human effects testing require-
ment.
• Development and employment of NLW have implications at
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
Required Capabilities
• When it is not clear to the services what capabilities are
required, then the DOD must engage to define the
exigence.
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• In the case of nonlethal weapons, clearly defined requirements
and capabilities common to all services are needed. But there
are also some NLW needs and opportunities for the individual
prestations de service.
Management Enhancement
Consideration should be given to establishing a Joint Program
Office for Nonlethal Weapons for the following reasons:
• A JPO consolidates multiple separate and frequently dis-
tinct acquisition processes under a single acquisition process
administered by one milestone decision authority.
• A JPO is best postured to develop NLW that respond to warfight-
er (combatant commander) needs.
• A JPO brings synergy to the acquisition process.
• A JPO will achieve greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness
in the development and fielding of nonlethal weapons.
• JPOs have demonstrated their utility, responsiveness, and
efficacité. An illustrative case and a model that could be
used to develop a JPO for Nonlethal Weapons is the one that
has been applied to improve joint capabilities in chemical, bio-
logical, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense.
Recommended Actions
• Establish a Joint Working Group to clearly define required
capacités.
• Establish a Joint Program Office or greatly expand the
resources and authority of the JNLWD.
• Identify funds to manage and procure NLW.
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The chosen organization would be headed by a general offi-
cer, preferably by a major general. What counts more than rank,
however, is that the director should be recognized as having con-
siderable decision authority and the ability to direct substantial
amounts of money.
Although we have cast these considerations in terms of the famil-
iar JPO, such capabilities could be given to a greatly expanded
JNLWD—a JPO by another name.
The Task Force considered the alternative of housing an
expanded effort within the Joint Forces Command ( JFCOM). le
head of US JFCOM is also the Supreme Allied Commander, Trans-
formation. As such, he oversees transformation for both NATO
and the US military. JFCOM's stated tasks include “discovering
promising alternatives through joint concept development and exper-
imentation, defining enhancements to joint warfighting require-
ments, developing joint warfighting capabilities through joint
training and solutions, and delivering joint forces and capabilities
to warfighting commanders.” Evidently JFCOM already has the
responsibility to include NLW where appropriate in the accom-
plishment of its stated tasks. This responsibility should be made
explicit, whether or not JFCOM is given the primary role in
NLW. This option might involve creating within JFCOM an enti-
ty similar to the free-standing, expanded JNLWD or Nonlethal
Weapons Joint Program Office (NLJPO) detailed in the first
option.
The Task Force has not explored whether JFCOM has a strong
desire to house the equivalent of a JPO for Nonlethal Weapons
or the expanded JNLWD. This should be pursued by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to compare a JPO
with a comparable effort within JFCOM and to choose the
approach that best fits with the ongoing transformation effort.
The optimum appears to us to have a JNLWD or NLJPO out-
side JFCOM but to create a small cell within JFCOM to work
closely with the expanded JNLWD, both to inform the directorate
of needs and to facilitate the placement of prototype and production
capabilities within JFCOM.
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Whichever mechanism is chosen for the early realization of the
benefits of NLW, there are objective problems to be overcome and
opportunities to be seized. Here are some considerations.
E MERGING T ECHNOLOGIES AND U NFULFILLED N EEDS
Existing working arrangements do not permit frequent JNLWD
insight into some apparently much larger classified programs in
the individual services, and the JNLWD has no authority over
these programs when they are in the services. One such devel-
opment emerged from the classified world in 2001 as the vehicle-
mounted area denial system (VMADS), a high-power millimeter
wave system with a large and accurate antenna used to create intense
surface heating of the skin of people targeted at a distance of hun-
dreds of meters without producing permanent damage.
Many NLW are proposed, but few make the grade of effectiveness,
compatibility with the presence of our own troops, and adequate
safety for use in situations in which potential antagonists are
mixed with civilian crowds or hostages. For instance, intense
acoustic sources have thus far been found wanting, in that they expose
our own troops to damaging sound levels when they are used to
project sound to disable or repel opposing forces at a distance. Sim-
ilarly, high-power microwaves or short-pulse systems for dis-
abling vehicles will not work against simple diesel-powered
vehicles. And clearly there are situations in which the VMADS
would be helpful, but it is far from certain that a force to be pro-
tected would have a VMADS with it. In addition, countermea-
sures might proliferate in the form of aluminum-foil umbrellas,
perforated with small holes to allow for visibility but able to block
the penetration of the millimeter waves from the VMADS.
As noted by the JROC, there is a clear need to extend the effec-
tive range of NLW. In some cases, it is a matter of finding a way
to use riot control means such as rubber pellets at a greater dis-
tance, in order to increase the standoff between the crowd and
the friendly forces. As recognized by the JROC memo, one gen-
eral approach is to provide remote-delivery capability, using
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Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
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proximity-fused systems together with combustible or frangible
cases for the submunitions carrying the pellets. The millimeter wave
area denial system is one option, but it requires a clear line of sight.
What is sought in this regard is the ability to send out in a dis-
criminating fashion, preferably semi-automatically, containers
with multiple rubber balls, dye cartridges, or whatever is in use,
so that they will explode at a specified height above the crowd and
project the NLW as desired. To clear a large crowd in other than
combat situations, tear gas would also be a tool of choice, and such
submunition systems would be helpful in that case as well as in
the comparable domestic riot control actions. There is clear ben-
efit to reducing the time currently required (from 45 minutes to
a few seconds) for a soldier with a backpack sprayer to provide a
mobility-inhibiting slippery coating over a large area; this could
be achieved by a system of fireworks-like munitions and submu-
nitions that would deploy from a kit to spread over an area and
to dispense the liquid.
In one of the fables in Appendix B, we discuss a potential sys-
tem that uses laser sources and relay mirrors mounted quickly and
unobtrusively on buildings in order to direct the laser against
targets that might not be in direct line of sight. This is, of course,
only an example. Any contender for development and adoption
needs not only a similar treatment but also an analysis of the detailed
system and its cost and effectiveness, as well as its human effects.
As identified also by JROC, there are serious deficiencies in the
US ability to clear a space (ie, to clear people from a space), whether
a plaza or a building. If hostages are absent, and if proper invest-
ments are made using current technology, it is feasible and prac-
tical to collapse a building of almost any size. But this may be
undesirable in view of the cost to the infrastructure of this destruc-
tion and the lack of reversibility. Distributed high-intensity sound
projectors could be helpful, but for use in buildings they might need
to be supplemented with robotic means for finding and blowing
down doors—without setting buildings on fire—such as the use
of mild thermobaric weapons. But with similar technology, a
combination of robotic cameras and lethal force (to some extent
suicide robots) might be used to search for enemy combatants. Si
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the outcome appears inevitable, combatants will normally surrender
so long as they expect to be treated according to the rules of war,
but responsibility for the enemy prisoners of war could greatly slow
the lightning advance of modern war.
New packages for current payloads do not arouse the excite-
ment of new and speculative developments but may be the most
useful interim approach and may be a contender for the long term
against alternative future capabilities.
Take the Taser, for example, as a candidate for product improve-
ment. The Taser's range is strictly limited to the 21-foot length of
its wires. It would be highly desirable to extend the range to 100
feet, and that could be done by a significant engineering modifi-
cation, without the need for ab initio human-effects testing.
For instance, instead of the two barbs, one could propel the power
source, equipped with barbs or nettles, to strike the target and make
contact. Radio control would then allow the source to be turned
on in a flexible fashion, just as is the case with the Taser-
mounted source. No wires would be involved, so there would be
no possibility of short circuiting. In order to maintain accuracy so
as to strike the desired individual, even if he is moving, the car-
tridge could be equipped with a system to home on the laser spot
provided by the current Taser system.
This modification of the Taser is similar in principle to the remote
delivery of blunt-trauma weapons such as rubber balls by a dis-
penser that is proximity fused and perhaps guided to the vicini-
ty of its target.
There is, of course, concern that enemy combatants will use coun-
termeasures against US nonlethal (or lethal) weapons. Tel
countermeasures can often be obtained on the global market, as
is the case with body armor or gas masks.
The JROC Mission Need Statement (MNS) of December 10,
2002, judged that “at the strategic level, the US needs a nonlethal
capability that can help defuse volatile situations, overcome mis-
information campaigns, and break the cycle of violence that often
prolongs or escalates conflict.” The Task Force recognizes the
value that such tools could have had in direct communication
to the populace for preventing the genocide in Rwanda or the
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Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
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ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, for example. However, the Task Force
was unsuccessful in learning about US capabilities of this type
and notes with regret that they were not used to a significant extent,
if they did exist.
L EARNING FROM E XPERIENCE
From April 21 to 26, immediately following the taking of Bagh-
dad, US Army MPs and a Marine Corps unit conducted a
search for Baath Party members. Trained at a joint school, they
used elements of marine and army NLCS to suppress crowds in
an urban environment, both day and night, that would have inter-
fered with the operation.
Army experience with nonlethal capability sets in Iraq has
resulted in some early reports briefed to the Task Force. Pour
instance, one of the NLCS was used to equip a Quick Reaction
Force (QRF), and there are accounts of the QRF being called to
support small units that had been surrounded by hostile crowds.
The appearance of the QRF and the banging of batons on shields
was usually enough to disperse the crowd and to allow the unevent-
ful departure of the unit.
There is an understandable appeal to lightness and easy oper-
ability. Some NLW equipment is worn on the body so as to be avail-
able in combat. Equipment too heavy to be worn may be kept in
the armed personnel carrier (APC) and may not be available
when needed. Note that the Special Operations Command (SOC)
might need lighter and smaller NLW tools than the infantry,
with its greater transport capability, and SOC forces operating
individually—as is the case with intelligence operatives—have an
even greater need for such equipment. In all cases, training is essen-
tial so that the individual will understand the capabilities and lim-
itations, as well as when it is more desirable or effective to use NLW
in combat as opposed to or as a prelude to lethal force.
Because there was little NLW presence in the theater, experi-
ence is scarce. In early engagements, it was recognized by US forces
that NLW would be of use. Nonetheless, it was often too late or
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difficult to arrange equipment supply from the United States
and perform the necessary training. However, the Task Force is
encouraged by the indication that as part of the next Strategic Plan-
ning Guidance, OSD will require combatant commanders “to iden-
tify what they need for nonlethal weapons and to plan for the use
of nonlethal weapons in operations.”
In addition, the Task Force considered three typical but fan-
ciful applications—each keyed to a real-world event or need. le
examples address both requirements and constraints and the need
to repel or compel without lethality until hostile intent is inferred.
These “Three Iraqi Fables,” with commentary, can be found in Appen-
dix B, preceded by an account of a real engagement.
C AVEATS AND C OMMENTS
The Task Force does not suggest that the availability of nonlethal
weapons reduces the legitimacy of the use of lethal weapons. le
unit commander should have the choice of tools and tactics for
achieving the goal, consistent with the rules of engagement
(ROE). Higher military authority may set the ROE by consid-
ering not only tactical but operational and strategic goals.
For example, in response to attacks on US forces by isolated
snipers, a nonlethal response might be temporarily more effective—
such as dazzling lights to block vision for a few seconds—but the
enemy would continue to pose an unacceptable threat, and thus
effective lethal counterfire would be most appropriate. In this case,
NLW might be used to suppress further fire, while lethal coun-
tersniper action eliminates the sniper and serves to deter others
who might otherwise become snipers.
If NLW are available, there is concern that US armed forces
will be required to use them for every situation and will be con-
demned if they do not do so. The concern is not only for poten-
tial legal liability but also that lives of troops will be lost by delay
in resorting to effective lethal means.
NLW are a tool for achieving military goals while respecting
the principles of the laws of warfare—military necessity, propor-
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Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
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tionality, discrimination, avoidance of unnecessary suffering, and
minimizing collateral damage. Television coverage of encounters
involving NLW can still be repugnant, and it would be desirable
to provide reliable information to minimize unwarranted criticism.
A campaign of public diplomacy could help to enlist the support
of at least some human rights advocates and specialists in inter-
national law.
C HEMICAL N ONLETHAL W EAPONS
Existing chemicals have the ability to temporarily incapacitate per-
sonnel or to damage materiel, and there are lethal chemicals and
toxins as well. Modern technology and the detailed and evolving
understanding of the complex mechanisms of the cell, the nervous
system, and other aspects of the human body indicate that research
focused on military uses could result in substantial improvements
in effectiveness over tear gas and other chemicals now used in domes-
tic riot control. The use of existing or any future chemicals “as a
method of warfare” is banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), which the United States signed in 1993 and ratified in
1997, but their use for “law enforcement including domestic riot
control purposes” is specifically permitted. The potential benefits
of the use of existing chemicals and of the development of
improved compounds must be weighed against the costs involved
and also against the negative consequences of a US rejection of
the CWC.
The Task Force had extended discussion on the use of tear gas
(CS-2) in Vietnam and of the pros and cons of the use of biological
or chemical nonlethal weapons, together with the legal obligations
on parties to the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC). The MNS, for instance, in its mention of calmative
compounds, noted that it would “require substantial research to
develop a universally controllable capability.” Note, however, that
if enemy troops are flushed out with nonlethal force (or by the threat
of lethal force), according to the rules of war they must be given
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the opportunity to surrender unless they clearly retain a hostile intent,
in which case lethal force is justified.
The Task Force considered the benefits that would accrue and
the problems that would be posed by either a US attempt to inter-
pret the CWC or by a US move to amend or to renounce the CWC
in order to be able to use chemicals as nonlethal weapons against
enemy combatants. Note that it is only chemicals used for their
chemical action on individuals (or biological agents used against
either personnel or materiel) that are banned under the CWC or
the BWC. 3 Chemicals in napalm, no matter how toxic, are not banned;
chemicals that are used to reduce or eliminate traction are not banned;
nor are smoke, dyes, or obscurants.
There is little doubt that the use of tear gas would be helpful
in reducing the threat to civilians in cases in which enemy com-
batants are present among noncombatant civilians. Pesée
against this, however, is the prospect of the use of similar chem-
icals against US forces in a conflict of nations, and, worse, the
results of focused military research and development on chemi-
cal and biological agents, which is more likely to result in improved
lethal agents than in NLW. We note also that we have seen no
full scenarios for the use of calmatives. What happens in a situ-
ation where, after everyone is confused or knocked out, they
begin to revive, and the United States does not have an overwhelming
presence?
It has been the consistent US position—codified in Execu-
tive Order 11850, which was issued in 1975 and later placed as a con-
dition by the US Senate of its ratification in 1997 of the
CWC—that for the United States as an occupying power there
are permitted uses of riot control agents (RCAs) even in a theater
of conflict. For example, RCAs could be used to maintain order
in enemy prisoner of war camps, to control crowds in occupied cities
3 In a pending solicitation on NLW announced November 4, 2003, the JNLWD
states, “Proposals that use chemical or biological payloads will not be considered for non-
lethal counter-personnel concepts. . . . Proposals that use biological payloads will not be
considered for nonlethal counter-materiel concepts. Proposals that use chemical payloads
[for countermateriel purposes] must be consistent with US obligations under the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and other applicable law and regulations.”
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Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
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just as CS-2 and pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum, or OC) are used
domestically, and in areas outside the zone of immediate combat
to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary
organisations.
The Task Force had a full discussion with considerable pre-
paration and heard oral presentations from several authorities on
these points. Some of the pertinent materials are included as
Appendix C.
The Task Force believes that to press for an amendment to the
CWC or even to assert a right to use RCAs as a method of war-
fare risks impairing the legitimacy of all NLW. This would also
free others to openly and legitimately conduct focused governmental
R&D that could more readily yield advanced lethal agents than
improved nonlethal capabilities. While limited use of RCAs in accor-
dance with the traditional US position does not totally avoid these
risks, we believe they are outweighed by the potential benefits.
Accordingly, the Task Force judges that on balance the best course
for the United States is to reaffirm its commitment to the CWC
and the BWC and to be a leader in ensuring that other nations
comply with the treaties. Thus, the United States should declare
that it will not employ RCAs “as a method of warfare” but will use
them for law enforcement and other legitimate purposes, among
which are controlling enemy prisoners of war and controlling
crowds, in the exercise of its legal responsibilities as an occupy-
ing power. That is, the United States would comply with the CWC
and the BWC but would not refrain from actions that are in its
interest that it believes to be legal under the treaties.
F INDINGS
The Task Force finds that a continuing lack of focus on NLW and
on their subsequent integration in the DOD—with the changes
needed to make best use of the new capabilities—have delayed the
investments required to realize the benefits NLW have to offer.
Our principal findings include the following:
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1. If NLW capabilities are to realize their potential in greater and
more usable military capability, US military leaders must have
a sound understanding of NLW technologies as they become
available to the armed forces. Currently, both military and
civilian leadership remain insufficiently familiar with the capa-
bilities and limitations of NLW. This may stem from the fact
that with the few million dollars in the service programs,
NLW do not rise to the point of major decisions that would
take into account the benefits they offer.
2. In addition, there is a growing need for transformation with-
in the services in relation to NLW. Both the US Army and
the Marine Corps have reported success with the use of non-
lethal capability sets. It is time for the marines and army to build
upon this success and for their sister services, the air force and
the navy, to join them in expanding their use of NLW. The Marine
Corps must increase the basis of issue (quantity of items in the
sets) in their version of the NLCS and further define require-
ments for advanced NLW capabilities. The army must continue
and enhance their NLCS for the military police but, most
importantly, extend the capability to their infantry divisions. Ce
should be an immediate priority in support of Operation Iraqi
Liberté. As with the Marine Corps, the army must further define
requirements for advanced NLW capabilities. The navy has shown
little interest in the subject of nonlethal weapons, despite the
USS Cole incident, and the air force security forces have only
recently initiated the process to obtain NLCS. Finally, and just
as importantly, National Guard units should immediately be issued
NLCS to support contingencies associated with homeland
defense missions.
3. The JNLWD has done an excellent job in developing and
fielding current NLW capabilities, but some clearly feasible capa-
bilities may be lacking due to the limited funds and personnel
available to it. It has not had the staff or clout to coordinate fully
with other agencies within the US government or with other
governments in order to obtain promptly the best ideas and tech-
nologies. Nor is its staff of 19 sufficient for the directorate to
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Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
[34]
process the information to which it potentially has access, both
from the services and from international NLW programs.
4. Since the JNLWD has access only to program element (PE)
line 6.3B, or advanced development, to fund NLW, a program
outside of that category (in S&T funding or demonstration, engi-
neering, and development) has to be funded in the services. With-
out significant and dedicated funding for NLW S&T, technology
in this field will advance at a snail's pace.
5. The benefits of NLW will be attained only if US military and
civilian leaders along with diplomats and negotiators are aware
of the capability of NLW and the situations in which they can
be employed. Currently, successful use of NLW commands lit-
tle press coverage. For example, US marshals have had notable
success using NLW in the Vieques mission and in the control
of crowds demonstrating against World Trade Organization ses-
sions in the United States. In Iraq, those who have been struck
with rubber bullets from the NLCS fielded by the US forces
left promptly and did not return.
6. In regard to recent concerns over homeland security and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), NLW could be
useful in isolating a hot zone in the aftermath of a biological
attack. Through the assistant secretary for homeland defense,
the Department of Defense has the responsibility for plans and
equipment for the National Guard in the event it should be fed-
eralized. But even in the case of National Guard activities
under the command of the governor of an individual state, NLW
equipment and training would be of value.
7. Beyond the tactical use of NLW exemplified by Tasers and cal-
trops, there are opportunities and unmet needs, such as the detec-
tion and disruption of roadside bombs, the rapid deployment
of sensors, and the fusion of their output in support of the use
of nonlethal or lethal force or information warfare. De même,
the ability to broadcast television or radio signals to the pop-
ulation and to selectively disrupt unwanted broadcasts is clear-
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ly a nonlethal but valuable tool that, although it may exist in
limited form, has not been used to full effectiveness by the Unit-
ed States in recent conflicts.
R ECOMMENDATIONS
The Task Force concludes that wider deployment of existing
NLW capability—equipment, training, and command aware-
ness—would greatly increase US effectiveness in establishing a
civil society after major conflict. Advanced NLW and augment-
ed delivery capability for existing NLW could reduce the infra-
structure damage in combat operations. DOD and service programs
are simply inadequate in size and scope to yield these benefits from
NLW. Building on the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate, the
administration should create an entity of sufficient size and bud-
get that is the single focal point for all NLW activity. This would
provide a basis for interagency oversight across the departments
and agencies of the federal government that would allow for effi-
cient pooling of intellectual resources to assist in the development
and acquisition of nonlethal weapons and technologies.
The Task Force recommends:
1. The secretary of defense conduct a comprehensive review of NLW
with the objective of providing specific guidance to the services
that will result in a more robust and expanded NLW capabil-
ity. This guidance should ensure that all facets of a complete
nonlethal weapons program are provided resources with the goal
of expediting both basic and advanced NLW capabilities to all
of the services.
2. The creation of a greatly expanded JNLWD or a new Nonlethal
Joint Program Office (NLJPO) headed by a general officer with
access to all program element lines (budgetary categories 6.0 to
6.6). This would elevate the priority status of NLW within the
DOD. The office should operate at a level of some $200 mil-
lion to $400 million per year with the mission of fulfilling the
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Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
[36]
JROC Mission Need Statement for a joint family of non-
lethal weapons.
3. Within the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) there should be
a small support cell for NLW that would work closely with the
expanded JNLWD both to inform the directorate of needs and
to facilitate the placement of prototype and production capa-
bilities within JFCOM. JFCOM's stated tasks include “discovering
promising alternatives through joint concept development and
experimentation, defining enhancements to joint warfighting
requirements, developing joint warfighting capabilities through
joint training and solutions, and delivering joint forces and capa-
bilities to warfighting commanders.”
4. Regardless of the details of organization, it is imperative that
the JNLWD have insight into other NLW projects, both
inside and outside the services and on the national and inter-
national level. The leadership of NLW development must
have more frequent and deeper access to classified programs in
the services in order not to expend resources on creating capa-
bilities that already exist or that can be counted on to emerge.
Improved insight requires additional staff and funds but is not
automatically a consequence of such expansion. Insight, access,
and authority are essential for influence.
5. Actions are necessary to remove barriers to the incorporation
of NLW. There is a need to integrate information and train-
ing regarding NLW capabilities into the curriculum at entry-
level, career- level, intermediate, and top-level schools of all services;
this would increase the rate of NLW integration into current
force capabilities. A military occupational specialty (MOS)
with NLW expertise in each battalion, similar to the nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) officers located at the battal-
ion level, will allow combatant commanders to know what is
available in the current inventory of NLW. Beyond a NLW-
specific field manual, NLW should be included in the mission-
essential task list. The DOD can also assist in this process by
emphasizing both the acquisition of existing, proven NLW capa-
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bility and also the development and early evaluation and choic-
es among high-payoff systems.
6. The acquisition and employment of nonlethal weapons and tech-
nologies would benefit if additional objective public informa-
tion were readily available from the JNLWD. While not
suppressing the negatives of NLW, the directorate or its suc-
cessor should be a reliable and timely authority regarding the
status and utility of NLW.
7. To provide a focus and to ensure progress on realizing the
benefits of nonlethal weapons and of more general nonlethal
capabilities, including the extension of range by the use of
submunitions and straightforward improvements, the secretary
of defense would benefit from having a special assistant for
nonlethal capabilities. It is important that this official have
full knowledge of broadly relevant nonlethal capabilities—
including classified and compartmented ones such as psyops,
means for preventing the detonation of roadside bombs, and
sensors that can be integrated with immediate response
capacités.
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[38]
ADDITIONAL OR DISSENTING VIEWS
We are not yet doing enough to develop nonlethal capabilities
or to integrate them with our other capabilities. Missions such
as Iraq today demonstrate the need for life-conserving, envi-
ronmentally friendly, and fiscally responsible nonlethal options
with which to manage emerging challenges.
Janet Morris
I thank the Task Force chairmen, director, and members for this
important and timely report and offer additional views on: 1) the
Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate ( JNLWD) funding proposal,
2) the JNLWD/Joint Program Office ( JPO) structural emphasis,
and 3) the treatment of information operations.
My first two observations stem from a belief that the development,
fielding, and employment of nonlethal weapons (NLW) can be
fixed neither by spending “more” nor by changing staff relation-
ships. In the former case, the Task Force had so little insight into
classified or special access programs of a relevant nature that the
“$300 million” figure is at best unhelpful and at worst a gross under-
estimation of the real requirement within the context of a $400
billion defense program. On the latter—no matter how well con-
ceived by the Task Force and distinguished advisers—debate and
discussion on the “who/where/what level” etc. of a JNLWD only
serves to blur the need for political direction. NLW suffer a lack
of prioritization by key civilian leaders. The fielding of a robust
NLW capability requires that Congress (members and staff ) and
the administration (both the White House and the Defense
Department) determine that NLW play an essential role in Amer-
ican defense policy. Only decisive political direction will enable NLW
to compete with the plethora of mission-critical program prior-
ities. In both of these cases, I fear that our focus fuels future
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Additional or Dissenting Views
[39]
debates over dollars and directorates and bogs down real NLW
development until the next Council Task Force is convened.
Finally, I believe that we should clearly distinguish NLW
from the tools of information operations. In the context of this report,
NLW are weapons employed by combatant forces. Information
operations are generally conducted by C 4 ISR (command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance) forces. While these are complementary, we do neither
good service to blur their distinction.
Roderick von Lipsey
Page 49
[40]
TASK FORCE MEMBERS
G RAHAM T. A LLISON , Co-Chair of the Task Force, is Director
of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
and the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government. In the first term of
the Clinton administration, Dr. Allison served as Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Policy and Plans, where he coordinat-
ed Department of Defense (DOD) strategy and policy toward
Russia, Ukraine, and other states of the former Soviet Union.
R ICHARD L. G ARWIN , Director of the Task Force, is the Philip D.
Reed Senior Fellow and Director of Science and Technology Stud-
ies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Garwin is a long-
time consultant to the US government on national security
technology, policy, and arms control and a member of several advi-
sory committees in those fields.
T HEODORE G OLD is Director of the Joint Advanced Warfighting
Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). IDA's activ-
ities include exploring new joint operational concepts and design-
ing and conducting joint experiments. Dr. Gold is currently a member
of the DOD's Defense Science Board and has served a four-year
term as Chairman of DOD's Ballistic Missile Defense Adviso-
ry Committee.
J OHN J. H AMRE is President and CEO of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he
served as US Deputy Secretary of Defense (1997–99) and
Undersecretary of Defense (1993–97). Dr. Hamre worked for ten
years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
Note: Task Force members participate in their individual and not institutional
capacités.
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Task Force Members
[41]
R ICHARD H EARNEY , USMC (Ret.), is the former Assistant Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps and a Member of the 1997
National Defense Panel.
J AMES K ALLSTROM , USMC (Ret.), is the Homeland Security
Adviser to the Governor of New York. He is a career Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) officer with over twenty-eight years of ser-
vice, including four years directing the FBI's New York office.
P AUL K AMINSKI is Chairman and CEO of Technovation. Il a
served as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Tech-
nology and as Chairman of the Defense Science Board.
P AUL X. K ELLEY , Co-Chair of the Task Force, is currently
Chairman of the American Battle Monuments Commission
and Chairman of the National Legal Center for Public Inter-
est. From 1983 to 1987, General Kelley served as the 28th
Commandant of the Marine Corps and a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
D AVID A. K OPLOW is a Professor at the Georgetown University Law
Center, where he teaches courses in international law, arms con-
trol, and national security and directs a clinical program in sup-
port of applicants for political asylum. His writings concentrate
in the fields of arms control, nonproliferation, and treaty veri-
fication. He served as Deputy General Counsel (International
Affairs) in the US Department of Defense from 1997 to 1999.
H OWARD J. K RONGARD is Of Counsel to the international law firm
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. Previously he was General
Counsel of Deloitte Haskins & Sells and of Deloitte & Touche.
He is a Public Governor of the Pacific Exchange, a Director of
PCX Equities, and Director of the Legal Advisory Council of
the National Legal Center for the Public Interest.
T HOMAS L. M C N AUGHER is Vice President for Army Studies of
the RAND Corporation and director of RAND's Arroyo Cen-
ter, the US Army's federally funded studies center. Before join-
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Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
[42]
ing RAND in 1995, Dr. McNaugher was a Senior Fellow at
the Brookings Institution, specializing in defense strategy and
politique.
C HRISTOPHER M ORRIS is Vice President of M2 Technologies. Il
has been involved with concepts and policy initiatives since the
1980s that resulted in the Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate’s
formation.
J ANET M ORRIS * is President of M2 Technologies. She was previ-
ously the Research Director of the US Global Strategy Coun-
cil. She authored early draft policies and definitions for nonlethal
weapons.
G REGORY S. N EWBOLD , USMC (Ret.), is Executive Vice Presi-
dent and Chief Operating Officer of the Potomac Institute for
Policy Studies. Lieutenant General Newbold previously served
as Director of Operations ( J3) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; War-
fare Policy Planner on the Joint Staff; and as the Director of the
Manpower Plans and Policy Division at Marine Corps headquarters.
W ILLIAM S CHNEIDER J R . chairs the Defense Science Board.
R OBERT F. T URNER is the co-founder of the Center for National
Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. A Viet-
nam veteran and the author or editor of more than a dozen books,
Dr. Turner worked in the Senate, the Pentagon, the State
Department, and the White House before serving as the first
President of the United States Institute of Peace.
E LIZABETH T URPEN is Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson
Centre. Dr. Turpen previously served as a Defense Legislative
Assistant.
R ODERICK VON L IPSEY ,* USMC (Ret.), is a private banker and invest-
ment strategist for Goldman, Sachs & Company. His previous
posts include Director for Defense Policy on the National Secu-
*The individual has endorsed the report and submitted an additional or a dissenting
vue.
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Task Force Members
[43]
rity Council staff, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, and Senior Aide to General Colin L. Pow-
ell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
L ARRY D. W ELCH , USAF (Ret.), is Senior Fellow and former
President of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). Il était
previously Chief of Staff of the US Air Force.
M ALCOLM H. W IENER chaired the 1995 Task Force on Nonlethal
Technologies sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and
wrote its report. He was a member of the 1999 Task Force.
C HARLES W ILHELM , USMC (Ret.), is Vice President and Direc-
tor of Homeland Security Programs at the Battelle Memorial
Institute. General Wilhelm served as Commander in Chief of
US Southern Command during his thirty-eight years in the
Marine Corps. He is a veteran of combat operations in Vietnam,
Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia.
Page 53
Page 54
[45]
TASK FORCE OBSERVERS
E MIL R. B EDARD
US Marine Corps (Ret.)
R ICHARD K. B ETTS
Council on Foreign Relations
P ETER D OTTO
M2 Technologies; US Marine Corps (Ret.)
J OHN W. F OLEY
American Systems Corporation; US Marine Corps (Ret.)
G EORGE P. F ENTON
American Systems Corporation; US Marine Corps (Ret.)
E DWARD H ANLON
US Marine Corps; Combat Development Command
D AVID P. K ARCHER
US Marine Corps; Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate
K EVIN B. K UKLOK
US Marine Corps
S USAN D. L E V INE
Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate
J OHN J. N ELSON
American Systems Corporation
C HUCK R ICE
US Marine Corps; Joint Nonlethal Weapons Directorate
J OSEPH R UTIGLIANO
Judge Advocate General, US Marine Corps
Page 55
Page 56
APPENDIXES
Page 57
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[49]
APPENDIX A: CURRENTLY AVAILABLE (OR NEARLY
AVAILABLE) NONLETHAL WEAPONS 4
1. W EAPONS AND T ECHNOLOGIES I NCLUDED IN THE
N ONLETHAL C APABILITY S ETS (NLCS)
200 riot face shields
3 handheld spotlights
200 31-inch riot batons
200 flexcuff packs
12 training batons
(10 per pack)
13 10-watt bullhorns
18 squad OC training
5,000 caltrops
canisters
45 squad OC (pepper spray)
120 fireteam OC training
dispensers
canisters
92 fireteam OC dispensers
400 individual OC training
891 individual OC dispensers
canisters
canisters
27 12-gauge shotguns
81 shotgun ammunition
(redistributed)
pouches
741 shotgun bean bag rounds
236 shotgun training rounds
348 blank/shotgun launching
27 shotgun gas grenade
cartridges
launchers cartridges
798 fin-stabilized rubber
4,050 buckshot cartridges
40-mm shotgun rounds
702 40-mm rubber rounds
702 40-mm wooden rounds
1,512 40-mm Stinger cartridges 162 40-mm nonlethal
162 Stingball/flash-bang
ammunition-carrying
pouches
pouches
729 Stingball/grenades
72 Stingball training
40 full-length riot shields
grenades
2 riot baton training suits
729 MK 141 flash-bangs
9 rifleman's combat optics
4 As provided to the Task Force by the JNLWD, November 11, 2003.
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2. O THER C OMMERCIAL O FF - THE -S HELF NLW C APABILITIES
une. Taser—causes electromuscular disruption to incapacitate
personnel
b. lightweight shotgun system (LSS)
c. high-intensity directed acoustics (HIDA)
ré. OC pepperball rounds
e. X-Net—man-portable or pre-emplaced
F. tactical unmanned ground vehicle (TUGV) nonlethal
payloads
g. MK 19 nonlethal short-range munition
3. J OINT N ONLETHAL W EAPONS P ROGRAM (JNLWP)
A CQUISITION P ROGRAM
une. 66-mm vehicle-launched nonlethal grenades (VLNLG)
b. mobility denial system (MDS)
c. clear a space distract/disorient (CAS D/D)—distracts or
disorients
ré. hand-emplaced nonlethal munition (HENLM)—passive
infrared (IR) trigger sensors and two Taser subassemblies
e. nonlethal mortar munition (NLMM)
F. objective individual combat weapon (OICW) nonlethal
rounds—nonlethal airburst munition to burst at a precise
emplacement
4. A DVANCED C ONCEPT T ECHNOLOGY
D EMONSTRATIONS (ACTD)
une. active denial system (ADS)—millimeter wave energy
b. advanced tactical laser (ATL)
5. JNLWP D EVELOPMENT P ROGRAMS
pulsed-energy projectile (PEP)
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[51]
APPENDIX B: THREE IRAQI FABLES
L ESSONS FOR N ONLETHAL W EAPONS
First the report of one actual incident:
Contexte
As a major in the Marine Reserve, XX graduated from the first
nonlethal weapons instructor course. Leaving Kuwait for Bagh-
dad, he requested nonlethal weapons (NLW) from the ships and
took them with the team into Iraq.
NLW was worth its weight in gold.
The perfect situation occurred in Baghdad one night when we were at
Rasheed Military Base (home of the Republican Guard). One night
[Iraqi civilians] were coming through holes in the walls and looting
the quartermaster's buildings inside our perimeter. The company CO
[commanding officer] ran over to me and asked if we had NLW. I told
him we did. He asked if we knew how to use them, and I told him we had
been training for two months for this exact situation. Then I asked him
how many guys were we dealing with? He said about a thousand. I said,
“We only have 8 guys.”
We went out anyway and moved them using LAPD [Los Angeles Police
Department] riot control tactics since my team chief is an LAPD firearms
instructor. I'm a DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration] firearms
instructor too. We got on line with the public address systems running with
my Arabic speaker, spot lights, shotguns loaded with bean bag rounds, Stinger
grenades, and of course everyone with lethal weapons. Within 10 minutes
we were able to clear about a thousand people which a company [lacking
NLW] could not for hours. Simply because we could fire [at them] and
the other guys were restricted from shooting civilians. We held that
perimeter until the next afternoon when [another unit] showed up to take
le périmètre. During those hours I can't tell you how many people had
NLW used on them. I personally shot at least 50 rounds of bean bags, anoth-
er 30 fin-stabilized rubber rounds, at least a dozen Stinger grenades, a bot-
tle of OC, and [engaged in] plenty of good old fashioned action with batons.
Bottom line: NLW worked great! We later employed them from time
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to time when the circumstances dictated during stabilization operations.
The message was loud and clear to the civilian looters/rioters. NLW
were a big success story for us.
I RAQI F ABLE 1
A Confrontation (as reported by Pangloss International)
Two Iraqi civilians suffered broken ankles and one a bruised
elbow in the town of al-Majar al-Kabir on June 25, 2003, when a
400-person civilian protest over intrusive searches of Iraqi homes
escalated into a confrontation. British troops had carried out
house-to-house searches in a manner offensive to Muslim tradi-
tions. As the crowd of protesters grew large, vocal, and con-
frontational, children began the fighting by throwing stones. le
British troops responded with warning shots and then launched
CS-2 tear gas canisters to disperse the crowd. The incident was
not considered news.
En réalité
Six British soldiers and 4 Iraqi civilians were killed and another
8 Britons and 17 Iraqis were injured in the town of al-Majar al-
Kabir on June 25, 2003, when a 400-person civilian protest over
intrusive searches of Iraqi homes escalated into a firefight. Britanique
troops had carried out house-to-house searches in a manner
offensive to Muslim tradition. As the crowd of protesters grew large,
vocal, and confrontational, the British troops were left with noth-
ing but rubber bullets and live ammunition to quell the uprising.
Children began the fighting by throwing stones, and the British
troops responded with warning shots, eventually firing into the crowd
with live ammunition.
http://www.arabia.com/newsfeed/article/english/0,14183,401552,00.html
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/06/25/sprj.irq.intl.main/
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Interpretive Note
From experience with crowds in the United States and Europe,
the use of tear gas (CS-2) would have cleared the crowd and
avoided the escalation to live fire. Widely used in domestic riot
control, CS-2 would have caused little harm. Why was this not
done?
Because the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bars riot
control agents “as a method of warfare.” It also requires nations
that are parties to the treaty to register with the CWC Organi-
zation the riot control agents they have used domestically, and CS-
2 is one commonly registered. To permit the Panglossian outcome,
an interpretation of the CWC might be sought as an amendment,
or as a judgment in a suitable court, or simply asserted by a sub-
stantial number of treaty parties, that such riots in wartime or in
the aftermath of war are not “warfare” and thus registered riot con-
trol agents could be used. A more far-reaching amendment could
seek to eliminate the bar to the use of riot control agents as a method
of warfare and thus permit the use of those that have been regis-
tered by a treaty party for at least two years.
In this particular confrontation, if it was judged that the crowd
was civilian and not combatant, even if many were armed with the
self-protection arms ubiquitous in Iraq after the end of major con-
flict, the use of tear gas by an occupying authority would be
acceptable under the CWC.
I RAQI F ABLE 2
A Van at the Checkpoint (as reported by Pangloss International)
The driver of a van approaching a US checkpoint ignored sig-
nals to stop. Warning shots were fired, with no result. Arms at the
ready, the soldiers activated the X-Net barrier; barbs penetrated
the front tires of the van, and the strong net to which the barbs
were fastened wound around the van wheels, bringing the vehi-
cle to a screeching stop.
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En réalité
US troops killed seven Iraqi women and children on March 31,
2003, when the Iraqis' van failed to stop at a US checkpoint. le
officer in charge ordered his troops to open fire when faced with
no alternative means to force the car to stop. US Central Com-
mand (CENTCOM) said the soldiers followed the rules of
engagement to protect themselves.
A statement issued by CENTCOM said soldiers motioned for
the driver to stop but were ignored. The soldiers then fired warn-
ing shots, which also were ignored. They then shot into the vehi-
cle's engine, but the van continued moving toward the checkpoint.
Ultimately, shots were fired into the passenger compartment.
The soldiers involved were from the Third Infantry Division,
the same unit that had lost four soldiers at a checkpoint near Najaf
two days earlier when an Iraqi soldier dressed as a civilian deto-
nated a car bomb.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/01/iraq/main547091.shtml
Interpretive Note: Problems for Dr. Pangloss
The X-Net barrier is a commercial offering and works as indicated.
As of June 2003, the US Army has the responsibility for evalu-
ation, and the US Special Operations Command has also
“expressed interest.” It would not totally solve the checkpoint
problème.
The vehicle driver, passengers, or the vehicle itself may pose lethal
threats to soldiers at vehicle checkpoints. When the threat comes
from the vehicle, the driver and passengers may be unwitting or
the driver coerced—even to the point of giving his life to spare his
family from torture. This means that inspection is difficult and dan-
gerous; perhaps paradoxically, one guard as an inspector is a less
lucrative target and may be less likely to be killed by a bomb than
would a team of three.
In case of a checkpoint guarding access to a valuable site,
where a ton or more of explosive could cause much more dam-
age than would a smaller bomb more readily concealed, the dri-
ver might try to run the checkpoint. More effective sign barriers
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[55]
warning of death if the vehicle does not stop and backed up by
command-detonated explosives would be useful. They could serve
as the ultimate backup to serpentine deployment of Stinger spike
strips, heavy block or earth barriers, and X-Net.
I RAQI F ABLE 3
Clearing an Apartment Block (as reported by Pangloss International)
As coalition forces entered Baghdad, the Special Revolutionary
Guard (SRG) was ordered by Saddam Hussein to distribute itself
in apartment blocks and government office buildings, ensuring that
many civilians in the same buildings would serve involuntarily as
human shields. US and British forces had practiced military
operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and were confident that they
would prevail, although they expected to suffer 30 percent casu-
alties in the process.
With the SRG holding hostage the civilian population, block
by block, building by building, coalition forces could not use
global positioning system (GPS)–guided bombs—Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAM)—to level buildings containing combatants
without killing the civilian hostages.
US forces executed for the first time a block-by-block sweep
to acquire territory and buildings. They were able progressively to
1. Monitor the surrounding streets to ensure no one was in the
street or to see how many were there and whether they were
likely to be armed;
2. Strike armed personnel if they ventured out; et
3. Destroy the site if the civilians left and the combatants remained.
Predator unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) helped with the
surveillance. Primarily, however, the operation used tiny cameras
remotely mounted on walls and parapets, with signal egress by
radio. Siege without food and water would eventually empty the
buildings—with the hostages in poor shape.
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[56]
The ability to kill or disable fighters holding human shields,
though not a new-felt need for law enforcement, was new for the
military. The laser-driven pulsed-energy projectile with remote relay
mirror filled this need. In some cases, remotely fired Taser pack-
ages were used, which homed on spots from laser designators. Comme
a consequence, the SRG stayed in the buildings until they surrendered.
The operation took six weeks because some buildings had
stores of food and water. It depended on a prior heavy investment
in an integrated system of observation and response—both lethal
and nonlethal.
En réalité
Iraqi armed forces did not fight this way, although persistent
sabotage and lethal attacks on coalition forces kept the economy
on its knees and are a serious and increasing but different
problème.
Interpretive Note
In this scenario, there is an evident need to render buildings tem-
porarily uninhabitable and thus to reduce the need for wide-
spread siege. Closed interior doors appear to make infrasound
ineffective as a tool to cause building evacuation. Finely dis-
persed pepper spray and tear gas (eg, oleoresin capsicum [OC]
and CS-2) are banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
when employed “as a method of warfare.” Malodorants, although
nontoxic in normal terminology, are probably also classed as “riot
control agents” and their use in this application is forbidden by the
CWC. However, police forces in the United States have begun
to use foul-smelling materials (gelled essence of skunk) to prevent
the occupation of vacant buildings; it would likely be acceptable
to do the same in a theater of war, even if the treatment prevent-
ed the entry of combatants as well as civilians.
Laser weapons for blinding are banned under Protocol IV of
the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The prohi-
bition on lasers is not as strict as is commonly interpreted, since
Protocol IV reads,
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[57]
Article 1: It is prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed,
as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause
permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, which is to the naked eye or
to the eye with corrective eyesight devices. The High Contracting Parties
shall not transfer such weapons to any State or non-State entity. 5
The pulsed-energy projectile (PEP) under development uses
a chemical laser technology to produce a large flash, bang, and shock
wave to temporarily disorient and incapacitate individuals in a crowd.
Many obstacles must be overcome to make it a useful and prac-
tical weapon, including the transition to solid-state laser technology.
The result may be too large to provide the necessary presence with-
out the relay mirror system invoked in the fable. For instance, such
a laser weapon operating from a range of 500 meters would need
a lens about 8 centimeters (three inches) in diameter to produce
a focused spot one centimeter in diameter with a wavelength of
1.3 micrometers. Smoke would be a readily available counter to this
weapon and also to surveillance of the street.
G ENERAL C OMMENTS ON THE F ABLES
These specific cases do not capture the full impact of a family of
nonlethal weapons and capabilities. Furthermore, the examples are
limited to the tactical realm, with, of course, operational and
strategic implications. Another approach would be to start with
the operational need and from this to infer the requirement to “clear
a block” of buildings. This would entail the consideration of exist-
ing and potential lethal and nonlethal weapons and is closely
related to the planning and implementation process for both the
acquisition and use of these capabilities. Nevertheless, the specifics
illustrate the more general concepts involved.
5 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) , Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion, adopted October 13, 1995.
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[58]
APPENDIX C: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
NONLETHAL WEAPONS
A N O BJECT L ESSON —T EAR G AS IN V IETNAM
A memo for the president from Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara of September 22, 1965, requested presidential approval
for reaffirmation of “the current national approval for use of riot
control agents CS and CN under the combat conditions described
above.” He noted, “Of particular importance would be the reduc-
tion in casualties to civilians who are inevitably mingled with hos-
tile military elements as the result of VC (Vietcong) tactics.”
The abstract of a very interesting 1973 US Army report on tear
gas in Vietnam reads, 6
This report summarizes data on agent CS that was used operationally in
Vietnam. The characteristics and uses of CS munitions are presented
and discussed. Results of this survey indicate that agent CS was employed
in the following roles: (1) suppression of enemy fire; (2) enhancement of
friendly fire; (3) search (or reconnaissance); (4) restriction of enemy use of
les zones; and (5) reduction of property damage. The assessment of the effec-
tiveness of a nonlethal weapon, such as CS, was difficult because of dif-
ferent objectives for its use. The high demand for CS munitions by troops
in the field may be an indication of the effectiveness of CS (as used in Viet-
nam). [p. iii]
Agent CS was used operationally in Vietnam from late-1965 through
1971. Many tons of bulk CS and many thousands of CS munitions were
expended during this period. [p. 118]
The text also comments,
Numerous reports, given to show the utility of agent CS in combat, indi-
cated that conventional weapons had been used extensively, and unsuccessfully,
prior to the introduction of CS munitions, sometimes for a period of days.
6 “Technical Report: Operational Aspects of Agent CS,” by Paul L. Howard, April
1973. (Unclassified, originally “Confidential.”)
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[59]
Then with the use of CS the objective was attained and with very few casu-
alties. Proper training and/or the proper integration of CS weapons into
infantry tactics would have assured success of the maneuver initially. le
use of CS munitions as an integral part of our combat capability will opti-
mize the successful results expected from such use. The programmed or
concurrent use of CS with conventional fires will enable combat troops to
receive the most benefit from the enhancement of the conventional fires
by the CS. [p. 118]
The report concludes,
8.1.3 (U) Observations (U)
Based on a review of the available data on the use of agent CS in Viet-
nam, the following observations are deemed pertinent:
Nonpersistent CS was a useful complement to conventional weapons
and contributed to the success of units in combat in attaining their
objectifs.
There was little evidence that the extensive use of bulk CS in the area
restriction role was effective in reducing the enemy's combat capabilities.
The availability of protective masks was essential to preclude the abort
of CS missions. Equally essential was the requirement that troops be
trained in the use of the mask and be confident of their ability to fight while
masked.
The reported ability of friendly troops to fight while masked would indi-
cate that the successful use of protective masks by an enemy would severe-
ly limit the contribution of agent CS to the success of a mission.
Field reports have indicated that the use of nonpersistent CS to
enhance friendly fires by flushing the enemy from hidden or fortified posi-
tions contributed to a reduction in the number of friendly casualties in Viet-
nam. [p. 119]
T EAR G AS AND THE C HEMICAL W EAPONS
C ONVENTION (CWC) OF 1993
With respect to riot control agents, we find the following in the
Chemical Weapons Convention: 7
Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of
warfare. [3. Art. I, Sect. 5]
7 See http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cw-cwc-text.pdf .
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[60]
“Riot Control Agent” means: Any chemical not listed in a Schedule,
which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling phys-
ical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of
exposition. [3. Art. II, Sect. 7]
Specify the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts
Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it holds for
riot control purposes. This declaration shall be updated not later than 30
days after any change becomes effective. [3. Art. III. Secte. 1e]
Investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons, or of alleged use of
riot control agents as a method of warfare, initiated pursuant to Articles
IX or X, shall be conducted in accordance with this Annex and detailed
procedures to be established by the Director-General. [3. Part XI. A1]
T HE C ONFLUENCE OF C HEMISTRY AND B IOLOGY
As is evident from modern anticancer research, the development
of chemical and biological antitumor agents depends in large
part on a better understanding of the mechanisms of the cell. Dans
some cases, the mechanisms of tumor cells can be countered by
chemical agents very specific to the tumor. In other cases, biological
agents such as viruses can be used. The same research can be applied
to produce lethal or nonlethal weapons.
The unilateral renunciation of research on offensive biological
warfare agents by President Nixon on November 25, 1969, was soon
followed by the president's renunciation of work on toxins—the
product of bacteriological organisms. 8 Thus, botulinum toxin is
banned as a means of warfare by the Biological Weapons Con-
vention (BWC), although it is a chemical that could be synthe-
sized without the intervention of botulinus bacteria. Par exemple,
it could be produced efficiently by genetic manipulation of plants.
No matter how produced or synthesized, it would be banned by
the BWC. Likewise, modified toxins, which could never be pro-
duced by living entities, are banned by the CWC.
Nonmilitary research in biology and medicine will lead to
understanding that can greatly facilitate the development, production,
8 See www.fas.org/bwc/nixon_bw_renounce.pdf.
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[61]
and use of lethal and largely nonlethal chemical and biological agents.
But NLW-focused research will hasten the day that such mate-
rials are available not only to the United States but also to those
who would use them against us. In his November 25, 1969, state-
ment, President Nixon said, “First, in the field of chemical war-
fare, I hereby reaffirm that the United States will never be the first
country to use chemical weapons to kill. And I have also extend-
ed this renunciation to chemical weapons which incapacitate.”
AW ORLD WITHOUT B IOLOGICAL W EAPONS OR
C HEMICAL W EAPONS ?
If the choice were between a world in which the United States would
have and use chemical nonlethal weapons (CNLW) and biolog-
ical nonlethal weapons (BNLW) that were available also to other
states and nonstate groups and in which nonstate groups used also
lethal chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW), and
a world in which there were no use of lethal or nonlethal chem-
ical or bacterial agents in a theater of warfare, we would all choose
the latter. While a world free of BW and CW is not within our
grasp, it is highly probable that if the United States espouses
BNLW or CNLW several nations (and not only the renegades)
will adopt serious military programs for the development of lethal
agents in the guise of advancing the capabilities of nonlethal
ones.
It seems that the United States has three policy options at this
juncture in regard to CNLW and BNLW:
1. State unilaterally that the United States interprets the CWC
and BWC as allowing the use of nonlethal chemical and bio-
logical agents as a method of warfare.
2. State unilaterally, but preferably with some coalition partners,
to the CWC that the use of registered riot control agents
(RCA) is in the interests of humanity and that the United States
would use CNLW and BNLW as a method of warfare in the
Page 71
Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities
[62]
interests of reducing civilian casualties when civilians are
involved.
3. Take measures within the organizations of the CWC and the
BWC, in the UN Security Council, and in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and other military organiza-
tions to put teeth into the promised response to any use in war-
fare of CW or BW agents, lethal or nonlethal, in order that US
forbearance in such use would indeed result in a world in
which legitimate governments did not develop, possess, or use
lethal or nonlethal BW or CW in the theaters of conflict. le
goal would be that even renegade governments would be
deterred from such use by the prospect of a concerted response
led by the United States. This would not eliminate the prospect
of use by individuals or groups of terrorists, but it could limit
the progression to more capable and tested agents that might
become available to terrorists.
In the short term, there is no doubt that the use of tear gas or
other chemicals (option 1) could be helpful to US troops in
environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand,
the Task Force discussion indicates that there will be no support
among the parties to the CWC for such US positions on use. Même
our key partner in Iraq—the United Kingdom—has a strong
position against this.
The use of registered RCAs (option 2) might seem to have a
somewhat better chance. It would involve only those agents used
domestically as riot control agents and properly registered with the
CWC organization as RCAs. One could additionally limit the num-
ber of RCAs currently registered by any given state. Mais le
CWC contains a clear prohibition, as stated, of the use of RCAs
as a method of warfare. There would be no support among the par-
ties to the CWC for an exception.
There is much merit to option 3: “no gas” (and no poison
either), as expressed in the CWC and the BWC. Any other posi-
tion opens a Pandora's box of national research and development
of new agents, which can be far more toxic and more effective against
Page 72
Appendixes
[63]
US and coalition forces than the existing agents. It may also lead
to the legitimization of such weapons.
Option 3 would not restrict the US use of tear gas or other RCA
in controlling riots in enemy prisoner of war camps or in missions
to rescue downed pilots, for instance. On balance, the Task Force
notes the costs and benefits beyond those directly involved with
the first use of tear gas as a method of warfare in the modern age.
Expanding and strengthening the US commitment to the pro-
hibitions on the use of chemicals and biological and toxic agents
in warfare is essential if we are not to see such weapons developed
by states and used by them or others to devastating effect.
Option 3, which we advocate, would be far from a do-nothing
approche. It would require initiatives on the part of the United States
for the community of nations to universalize the CWC and the
BWC, and for the United States to lead a coalition for the
enforcement of the CWC and the BWC by actions against those
violating these conventions, even if they did not directly injure the
États Unis.
Page 73
S ELECTED R EPORTS OF I NDEPENDENT T ASK F ORCES
S PONSORED BY THE C OUNCIL ON F OREIGN R ELATIONS
* † New Priorities in South Asia: US Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
(2003)
Frank G. Wisner II, Nicholas Platt, and Marshall M. Bouton, Co-Chairs;
Dennis Kux and Mahnaz Ispahani, Project Co-Directors
* † Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US Public Diplomacy (2003)
Peter G. Peterson, Chair; Jennifer Sieg, Project Director
* † Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared (2003)
Warren B. Rudman, Chair; Richard A. Clarke, Senior Adviser; Jamie F. Metzl,
Directeur de projet
* † Burma: Time for Change (2003)
Mathea Falco, Chair
* † Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge (2003)
Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Co-Chairs; Eric Heginbotham,
Directeur de projet
* † Chinese Military Power (2003)
Harold Brown, Chair; Joseph W. Prueher, Vice Chair; Adam Segal,
Directeur de projet
* † Iraq: The Day After (2003)
Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Co-Chairs; Eric P.
Schwartz, Project Director
* † Threats to Democracy (2002)
Madeleine K. Albright and Bronislaw Geremek, Co-Chairs; Morton H.
Halperin, Project Director; Elizabeth Frawley Bagley, Associate Director
* † America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger (2002)
Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, Co-Chairs; Stephen Flynn, Project Director
* † Terrorist Financing (2002)
Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project
Co-Directors
* † Enhancing US Leadership at the United Nations (2002)
David Dreier and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs; Lee Feinstein and Adrian
Karatnycky, Project Co-Directors
* † Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in US and ROK Policy (2001)
Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Co-Chairs; Robert A. Manning,
Directeur de projet
* † The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration
(2001)
J. Robert Kerrey, Chair; Robert A. Manning, Project Director
* † Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century (2001)
Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director
* † State Department Reform (2001)
Frank C. Carlucci, Chair; Ian J. Brzezinski, Project Coordinator;
Cosponsored with the Center for Strategic and International Studies
* † US-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: A Follow-on Report (2001)
Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Co-Chairs; Julia Sweig and Walter
Mead, Project Directors
* † A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on US Policy Toward Brazil (2001)
Stephen Robert, Chair; Kenneth Maxwell, Project Director
* † Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia (2000)
Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chairs; Michael Shifter, Project Director;
Cosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue
† Future Directions for US Economic Policy Toward Japan (2000)
Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Chair; M. Diana Helweg Newton, Project Director
* † Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans (2000)
Steven Rattner, Chair; Michael BG Froman, Project Director
* † Nonlethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects (1999)
Richard L. Garwin, Chair; W. Montague Winfield, Project Director
† Available on the Council on Foreign Relations website at www.cfr.org.
*Available from Brookings Institution Press. To order, call 800-275-1447.
Page 74
COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN
RAPPORTS
PRESSE
nonlethal weapons
and capabilities
REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE
SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
US military forces, superbly capable of countering a defined enemy in
intense combat, are not properly supported for important current roles as
experienced in Kosovo and Iraq. If US units and allied forces are to
prevent looting and sabotage, control individuals and crowds, stop
uncooperative vehicles in an urban environment, and protect themselves
in stabilization and reconstruction activities, they will require new tools
and proper training to accomplish these objectives without harming
innocent people or destroying civil infrastructure. Had more of the
current nonlethal weapons (NLW)––including nets to entangle and stop
vehicles, slippery spray, rubber-ball projectiles, and electroconvulsive
weapons such as the Taser––been available for use by military and
security forces, such events could have been minimized or perhaps even
évité.
By providing an intermediate option between “don't shoot” and
“shoot,” the Task Force observes, NLW have enormous potential in the
new military roles of modern combat. Wider integration of existing types
of NLW into the US Army and Marine Corps could have helped to
reduce the damage done by widespread looting and sabotage after the
cessation of major conflict in Iraq. This Independent Task Force report
on Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities finds that incorporating these
and additional forms of nonlethal capabilities into the equipment,
training, and doctrine of the armed services could substantially improve
US military effectiveness.
Led by Dr. Graham T. Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School
of Government, and General Paul X. Kelley, USMC (Ret.), former
Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Task Force consists of former
military officers, business executives, academics, diplomats, and
congressional staff.
www.cfr.org
COU
NONLETHAL WEAPONS
AND CAPABILITIES
NONLETHAL WEAPONS AND CAPABILITIES